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I. INTRODUCTION
One of my favorite cartoons shows a lawyer saying to his client, "You have a
pretty good case, Mr. Pitkin. How much justice can you afford?" Professor Marc
Galanter, in his tour de force analysis of lawyer jokes, analyzes this cartoon as
well as jokes using the same punch line.' These jokes lend themselves to several
interpretations. Galanter focuses on the message that the legal system is biased in
favor of the wealthy.2 A complementary (but not complimentary) interpretation
portrays lawyers as economic predators, concerned more about their own financial
interests than their clients' interests.3 Although that interpretation certainly repre-
sents an element of the reality of lawyer-client relations, this scenario could, in
fact, reflect lawyers' genuine concern for clients' interests and, indeed, possible
subordination of the lawyers' own financial interests to benefit the clients. Pre-
sumably, few clients actually demand to "take their case all the way to the Su-
* Associate Professor and Director, LL.M. Program in Dispute Resolution, University of Missouri-
Columbia School of Law. J.D., Hastings College of Law; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison.
This article grows out of a conversation with the federal district court clerks in the Eighth Circuit, as
described infra at notes 7-8 and accompanying text. I greatly appreciate the insights of all the partici-
pants in that discussion. Thanks also to Wayne Brazil, Len Riskin, Donna Stienstra, Jud Watkins,
Roselle Wissler, Jim Woodward, and Susan Yates for comments on earlier drafts. The court clerks and
others who provided input do not necessarily subscribe to the views in this article except as noted.
1. See MARc GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE 244-46
(2005).
2. Id.
3. See id. at ch. 2.
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preme Court" as reflected in popular legend, but some clients undoubtedly do start
off by insisting that they are ready to engage the full panoply of legal procedures
needed to achieve their goals. Lawyers provide a valuable service to such clients
by discussing whether the advantages of extensive litigation are likely to outweigh
the disadvantages, whether the clients can realistically afford the likely costs, and
whether this would be the best strategy for achieving their goals.4  Thus, when
lawyers ask, in effect, "how much justice can you afford?," this question can be a
useful tactic for helping clients satisfy their most important interests.
Similarly, the courts have to consider how much justice they can afford,
though the question for the courts is how much they can afford to provide rather
how much they can buy. Ideally, courts would provide all litigants their "day in
court" cheaply and easily if they want it.5 In the real world, however, courts have
limited resources, and they need to manage their resources wisely to accomplish
their goals.
This article discusses how the court system can function optimally given de-
clining trial rates and the limited resources available. It does not provide a de-
tailed analysis of court financing but rather discusses broad issues relating to the
role of trials in the legal system.
This article grows out of a conversation with clerks of court in the ten federal
district courts of the Eighth Circuit.7 I was invited to lead a discussion with the
clerks at the Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference in October 2005.8 These clerks
4. See John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer Disqualifi-
cation and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1332-36 (2003).
5. Even under ideal circumstances, however, trials may not be the optimal process for resolving
disputes because trials can harm relationships and reputations and produce other adverse conse-
quences. While indulging in fantasies about ideal situations, we could add the hope that all disputants
would seriously attempt to resolve their differences before invoking the legal system. Moreover, they
would settle only if they believe that a settlement is appropriate and not because of excessive concern
about the cost, time, or risk of going to trial.
6. This article focuses primarily on the federal courts, which have experienced more dramatic
declines in trial rates than the state courts. See John Lande, Shifting the Focus From the Myth of "The
Vanishing Trial" to Complex Conflict Management Systems, or ! Learned Almost Everything I Need to
Know About Conflict Resolution From Marc Galanter, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 191, 196
(2005). The state courts handle many more cases than the federal courts. There is great variation in
structure and process in the state courts and less data, so it is harder to generalize about the state courts.
See Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examining Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976-2002, 1 J. EMPtRiCAL LEGAL
STUD. 755, 755-58 (2004). Thus, the dynamics described in this article may or may not apply to par-
ticular state courts. There is also considerable variation between the federal district courts, so one
should be cautious about generalizations in the federal courts as well. See infra note 30.
7. The Eighth Circuit includes Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and
South Dakota. Arkansas, Iowa, and Missouri each have two districts. The experiences and views of
the Eighth Circuit clerks may not be a good representation of clerks in other parts of the country,
especially clerks who administer courts in very large metropolitan areas. Although there may be such
geographic differences, the views of the Eighth Circuit district court clerks may generally reflect a
perspective of professional court managers in many parts of the country.
8. Before the conference, I emailed a survey to the clerks which included questions about their
goals, responsibilities, and problems; efforts to achieve their goals and overcome problems; percep-
tions about changes in trial rates in their courts and reasons for any changes in trial rates; perceived
problems and benefits caused by any changes in trial rates; perceptions about the views of judges and
lawyers in their courts about changes in trial rates; and perceived effects of the Civil Justice Reform
Act, including a separate question about the effects of advisory groups established under that Act.
Clerks Initial Survey (on file with author). The email included several articles providing differing
perspectives about the "vanishing trial" phenomenon. Id. Before the conference, I prepared a sum-
[Vol. 2006
2
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2006, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 15
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2006/iss1/15
How Much Justice Can We Afford?
are experienced, knowledgeable, and professional. Most have law degrees or
masters degrees. 9 The median length of service as court administrators is 23 years
and the median period in their current positions is about 14 years.' 0 Court organi-
zations have grown in size and complexity, and the district court clerks, as the
principal court administrators, play a critical management role." The clerks de-
scribed their greatest challenge as satisfying and reconciling differing interests of
multiple stakeholders-with limited and uncertain resources. 2 Courts rely on the
clerks to take initiative in addition to managing the court operations. 3  Some
modem courts use "strategic plans," and the clerks provide leadership in develop-
ing and implementing strategic goals for their courts. 14
For modem court administrators, the question of how much justice we can af-
ford is no joke. It is a challenge that becomes more difficult as budgets fall be-
hind the increasing demand for and cost of court services.' 5 Presumably most
mary of the clerks' responses and emailed it to them. At the conference, I reviewed the summary and
led a wide-ranging conversation covering, among other things, the work of the courts generally, the
clerks' roles, and the place of trials in the courts. The discussion included several court-related em-
ployees in addition to the clerks. Following the conference, I emailed a follow-up survey asking for
information about their work experiences and further thoughts on the discussion. Clerks Follow-up
Survey (on file with author). Eight clerks provided responses to the follow-up survey. This article
does not include any responses from two of the clerks. Id. The clerks were promised that information
from the surveys and conference discussion would not identify any individual or court except to indi-
cate that the court is in the Eighth Circuit. Id.
This article does not necessarily reflect the views of any of the clerks who provided information for
this article except as specifically noted. Rather, it reflects my views, informed by input from the
clerks, among other things.
9. Six of the seven clerks who provided information about their educational background have law
degrees or masters degrees. Clerks Follow-up Survey, supra note 8.
10. Id. (Clerks 1, 2, 5-9). Their experience as court administrators ranged from 22 to 28 years. Id.
11. One clerk's resume describes his duties as follows:
managing activities that support the judges of the United States District Court including: proc-
essing paper and electronic documents and other information related to pending cases, courtroom
support, customer service to the bar and the public, processing appellate records, personnel ad-
ministration, accounting and financial operations, budget preparation and execution, jury selec-
tion and management, space and facilities management, procurement of furniture and office
equipment, automated case processing, personal computer acquisition, support and maintenance,
electronic internet access to court records, telecommunications, liaison between the court and
other agencies, service as a member of the Court Security Committee.
Resume, supra note 8 (clerk 8). Presumably the other clerks would have virtually the same responsi-
bilities.
12. Clerks Initial Survey, supra note 8 (clerks 1, 4-8).
13. Clerks Discussion, supra note 8.
14. Id. See, e.g., U.S. District Court, Western District of Missouri, Strategic Plan (2005) [hereinafter
Western District, Strategic Plan] (on file with author).
15. See infra Part I. Society presumably could provide more justice with increased court budgets.
It seems plausible that the number of trials is affected by the amount of public support for the courts.
Niemeijer & Klein Haarhuis report that the number of trials is increasing in the Netherlands, where the
total of judges and court personnel members grew more than a factor of four between 1951 and 2003
(from 2,420 to 13,221 in full time equivalents). See Bert Niemeijer & Carolien Klein Haarbuis, Van-
ishing or Increasing Trials in the Netherlands?, 2006 J. Disp. RESOL. 71. In England and Wales,
Dingwall & Cloatre relate a decline in the number of claims and trials to declining public support for
the courts. See Robert Dingwall & Emilie Cloatre, Vanishing Trials? An English Perspective, 2006 J.
Disp. RESOL. 51. In the U.S., it would be appropriate to increase financial support for the courts, but
given the current political environment, it seems unlikely that federal courts will get sufficiently in-
creased resources to make a significant difference in their ability to provide trials. See infra notes 46-
48 and accompanying text.
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analysts would agree, in principle, that courts should try cases when appropriate-
and help litigants 16 find just resolutions without trial when trial is not needed. It
seems obvious that the courts' ability to provide trials in some cases is possible
only if the vast majority of other cases are not tried. No one proposes a trial rate
above 50 percent or even anything close to that. The real controversy is about
when trial is appropriate and how that decision should be made.' 7
This article is part of the growing literature on the "vanishing trial."' 8 Much
of that literature analyzes various phenomena related to trial courts with relatively
little discussion of consequences of reduced trial rates or recommendations for
dealing with those consequences. This article provides a more systematic analysis
of potential problems related to changing trial patterns and possible strategies to
address those problems. This article could not provide a comprehensive inventory
of problems given its limited empirical base. Nor could it provide definitive or
universal prescriptions for dealing with such problems considering that the phe-
nomena involved are so complex and vary greatly. It contributes to the discussion
by cataloging and analyzing potential problems and prescriptions for dealing with
the problems.
Part II briefly describes some background about the federal district courts'
workload and financial situation. Part III identifies courts' goals for satisfying
litigants and society's interests in the courts. Part IV discusses benefits and prob-
lems caused by declining trial rates. Part V analyzes possible strategies for deal-
ing with problems caused by declining trial rates. These potential strategies in-
clude ensuring that litigants have a real choice of disputing procedures including
trial, routinely collecting and disseminating data on negotiation and settlement,
designing court facilities to fit realities of litigation, reforming legal education to
reflect the realities of legal practice, making judging more attractive to judges, and
expanding courts' roles in promoting local dispute resolution systems. Part VI
offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS' WORKLOAD AND FINANCIAL
SITUATION
Galanter presents a compelling compilation of data to show a general pattern
of decline in the proportion and number of cases terminated by trial in recent dec-
ades. For example, the number of civil trials in the federal district courts fell from
16. For simplicity, references to litigants in this article include their lawyers.
17. For classic critiques of ADR, reflecting preferences for trial, see Richard Delgado et al., Fair-
ness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wts. L.
REv. 1359; Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). These views are not limited
to scholars from the 1980s. At the Eighth Circuit Conference, District Court Judge William Wilson, Jr.
passionately defended the constitutional right to a jury trial and criticized court promotion of ADR.
Hon. William R. Wilson, Jr., Remarks at Program on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Eighth Circuit
Judicial Conference (Oct. 20, 2005).
18. See, e.g., Symposium, The Vanishing Trial, I J. EMPIRCAL LEGAL STUD. v (2004); Symposium,
The Vanishing Trial, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2004, at 3; Symposium, The Civil Trial: Adaptation
and Alternatives, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1251 (2005). I have referred to "the phenomenon known as the
vanishing trial" to suggest that the term "the vanishing trial" may give misleading impressions about
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5,802 to 3,951 between 1962 and 2004, despite the fact that there were five times
as many cases filed in 2004 as in 1962.19 Thus, civil trials comprised only 1.7%
of terminations in 2004, compared with 11.5 percent in 1962.20 Galanter finds a
particularly "precipitous decline" in the last two decades, which he relates to a
combination of factors, including what he describes as a "jaundiced view" of the
law promoted by major elements of business, political, and legal elites. This jaun-
diced view depicts a litigation explosion caused by opportunistic plaintiffs, greedy
lawyers, activist judges, and biased juries who combine to produce outrageous
verdicts that "unravel[] the social fabric and undermin[e] the economy.,
22
To account for the declining trial rates, Galanter offers five possible explana-
tions that are not mutually exclusive. First, American legal procedure is "con-
verging" with that in other court systems, where courts embrace a more manage-
rial judicial role, relying on procedures such as multiple hearings in trials over
extended periods of time. 23  Second, court trials are "displaced" by "trial-like
events" in non-court forums such as administrative tribunals, arbitration proceed-
ings, and hearings in various organizations. 24 Third, and related to the second,
non-court organizations are "assimilating" law into their regular governance proc-
esses, which mimic legal procedures. 25 Fourth, the law is being "transformed" to
embody "a new process rationality that supplants rule-centered, top-down, formal
rationality with a decisional process that is negotiative, informal, participative and
interactive. '26 Fifth, and presumably related to the fourth, the Anglo-American
legal system is "evolving" because parties are seeking more tailored, complex,
and future-oriented solutions to problems and thus look to non-court dispute reso-
lution procedures in many cases.27 All these explanations seem quite plausible,
with combinations of causal forces varying in different contexts.28 Although the
19. Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 7 [hereinafter Galanter, World
Without Trials].
20. Id. These data should be interpreted cautiously. Galanter presents data indicating that trials
have generally become longer and more complex in recent decades. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing
Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STuD. 459, 477-78 (2004) [hereinafter Galanter, Vanishing Trial]. Apparently there is no data
tracking the aggregate number of trial days over time; the increased length of trials would presumably
mitigate the apparent reduction in federal trials to some extent.
21. Galanter, writes:
The steady decline in the portion of cases tried has been in progress for more than a century,
marking a long historic movement away from trial as the mode of disposing of civil cases. ... In
the past twenty years, the pattern has changed: the long-term decline in the portion of trials has
intensified and accelerated, producing a dramatic drop in the absolute number of trials.
Galanter, World Without Trials, supra note 19, at 13.
22. Id. Galanter relates this recent precipitous decline to a combination of factors:
The decline of trials is not an isolated meteor flashing across the legal skies. Its current phase is
intimately connected to a set of other changes in American law over the past thirty years, changes
in elite ideology, institutional practice and legal culture that have transformed the legal environ-
ment.
Id.
23. Id. at 23-24.
24. Id. at 24-27.
25. Id. at 27-30.
26. Id. at 30-31.
27. Id. at 31-33.
28. In certain settings, some of these explanations may fit and others do not. See, e.g., Christopher
Honeyman, Worlds in a Small Room, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 107 (suggesting that evolution is the only
No. 1]
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precise mechanisms causing the vanishing trial phenomena are unclear, it appears
that the causes are complex and deeply rooted in larger social changes.29 It fol-
lows that substantial changes in the patterns of court trials in the future are likely
to require more than simple changes in policy or procedure.
Analyzing the district courts' combined civil and criminal caseload between
2000 and 2004 shows that the number of trials declined as the number of filed and
pending cases generally increased, consistent with the pattern Galanter identifies.
Table 130 indicates that the number of cases filed grew about 30,000 cases (from
about 322,000 to about 352,000). 31 The number of pending cases grew by about
50,000 cases (from about 301,000 to about 351,000 cases) and the number of
cases pending per authorized judgeship increased from 459 to 518 cases.32 If the
number of trials had not declined in this period (from 14,679 to 12,938), 33 the
number of pending cases would presumably have increased even more because
the additional tried cases almost certainly would have consumed more court time
than if they were terminated by non-trial procedures.
one of Galanter's explanations that would explain the pattern of adjudication rates in the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission).
29. For detailed collections of hypotheses explaining reduced trial rates, see Ad Hoc Committee on
the Future of the Civil Trial of the American College of Trial Lawyers, The "Vanishing Trial:" The
College, the Profession, the Civil Justice System, 226 F.R.D. 414, 414-15 (2005), available at
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cnfm?Section=All Publications&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cf
m&ContentFileD=-57 (last visited Mar. 5, 2006); Scott Brister, The Decline in Jury Trials: What
Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 191, 193-219 (2005); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year
Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1262-68 (2005); Nathan L. Hecht,
The Vanishing Civil Jury Trial: Trends in Texas Courts and an Uncertain Future, 47 S. TEx. L. REV.
163, 170-81 (2005); Margo Schlanger, What We Know and What We Should Know about American
Trial Trends, 2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 35.
30. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures, Tables 4.1, 4.3, at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/contents.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2006) [hereinafter AO,
Judicial Facts and Figures]. The years in the table are the fiscal years, which end on September 30.
These data should be interpreted with great care. As Table 1 shows, there are substantial fluctuations
from year to year. Moveover, these figures provide an overall picture but do not reflect factors such as
the number of judges actually on the bench at a given time (including magistrate and senior status
judges). In addition, there is great variation between courts. For example, in 2004, 1.6 percent of
civil cases reached trial for all of the U.S. district courts. In various district courts, however, this
percentage ranged from 0.6 percent to 4.9 percent, with rates of 1.0 percent or less in twelve districts
and at least 4.0 percent in eight districts. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Busi-
ness of the United States Courts, Table C-4A, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004
/appendiceslc4a.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2006) [hereinafter AO, Judicial Business]. For more detailed
analysis of court workload, see Shari Seidman Diamond & Jessica Bina, Puzzles About Supply-Side
Explanations for Vanishing Trials: A New Look at Fundamentals, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637
(2004).
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Authorized Judgeships, Civil & Criminal Cases Filed, Tried, Terminated, and
Pending in U.S. District Courts, 2000-2004
Fis- Au- Cases Cases Cases Cases Percent Filings Trials per Termina- Cases
cal thor- filed tried termi- pending termi- per author- tions per pending per
Year ized nated nated by author- ized authorized authorized




2000 655 322,225 14,679 318,355 300,928 4.6 492* 22.4 486 459
2001 665 317,907 13,558 309,165 308,640 4.4 478 20.4 465 464
2002 665 345,483 12,817 325,165 326,458 3.9 520 19.3 489 491
2003 680 323,604 12,948 318,643 321,597 4.1 476 19.0 469 473
2004 679 352,360 12,938 317,382 351,672 4.1 519 19.1 467 518
Table 1
Historically, a major increase in the number of pending cases coincides with
the beginning of the period of precipitous decline in the number and rate of trials
that Galanter identified.34 The number of pending cases has grown steadily since
the 1960s, with a period of particularly sharp growth between 1980 and 1983
when the pending caseload increased about 28 percent (from about 207,000 to
about 264,000 cases).35 During that period, the number of cases pending per
judgeship increased more than 21 percent, from 421 to 512 cases per authorized
judgeship. 36
Although trials capture people's imagination, they represent only a small pro-
portion of the courts' work. Federal "trial" courts3 7 must do many things in addi-
tion to conducting trials, including assisting litigants, providing overall case man-
agement, managing case documents, conducting pretrial hearings, deciding con-
tested motions, arranging for special services such as translation, administering
jury pools, supervising public defender and probation systems, operating ADR 3 8
34. See Galanter, World Without Trials, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
35. See AO, Judicial Facts and Figures, supra note 30, tl.4.1.
36. Id.
37. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. Rev. 1405
(2002)
38. The term "alternative dispute resolution" is generally used to refer to a set of dispute resolution
procedures including mediation and arbitration as well as a wide range of other procedures such as
early neutral evaluation, summary jury trials, and ombuds work. The term is conceptually problematic
but it is embedded in the vernacular and hard to avoid. It raises empirical issues about which proce-
dures are most common and philosophical issues about which procedures do or should have greater
value. These discussions often seem unproductive and it is often preferable to use the term "dispute
resolution," referring to all dispute resolution procedures, including litigation. See John Lande, Get-
ting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in Mediation, 5 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv.
137, 140 n.5 (2000) [hereinafter Lande, Getting the Faith]; John Lande, Toward More Sophisticated
Mediation Theory, 2000 J. DIsP. RESOL. 321, 324-25 [hereinafter Lande, More Sophisticated Theory].
This article uses "ADR" in its conventional meaning of mediation, arbitration, etc. to distinguish from
court adjudication procedures. Although there is some controversy about whether judicially-hosted
settlement conferences should be considered as a form of ADR, this article considers such settlement
conferences as ADR because they are alternatives to adjudication. Moreover, many federal courts
consider settlement conferences to be a form of ADR. See ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA
No. 1 ]
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programs, publicizing court decisions, and promulgating rules, policies, and pro-
cedures.
39
As caseloads have grown, courts have shifted some of their efforts from trials
to pretrial work.4° Galanter notes that "[c]learly, courts are more involved in the
early resolution of cases than they used to be.'41 A major study found that federal
judges are actively involved in holding pretrial conferences, setting pretrial sched-
ules and trial dates, setting limits on discovery, and ruling on motions.42 Judges
described their level of pretrial management as moderate or intensive in more than
half the cases. 4 3 Moreover, the decrease in the trial rate has been accompanied by
an aggregate increase in the rate of summary judgments in federal civil cases from
about 1.8 percent to 7.7 percent from 1960 to 2000, according to Professor
Stephen Burbank.44
Modem trials-especially jury trials-are expensive and burdensome for the
courts. Trials require numerous personnel in addition to judges, including law
clerks, courtroom clerks, court security officers, court reporters, and sometimes
interpreters. Obviously, jury trials require a pool of potential jurors, including a
substantial number more than actually will be needed. 45 Modem courtrooms re-
STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES
AND LAWYERS 20-28, 65 (1996); Donna Stienstra, Summary of Selected Features of ADR Procedures
in U.S. District Courts (Nov. 17-18, 2005) (unpublished document prepared for the Conference on
Court ADR Research, on file with author).
39. See generally ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR 2004, available at http://www.uscourts.govllibrary/dirrptO4/2004AnnualReport
Full.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2006) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT]. In addition to
functions specifically related to the law, trial courts have become complex organizations requiring
management of physical facilities, technological capabilities, human resources, information systems,
finances, and security (including, but not limited to, security related to prisoners), as well as coordina-
tion with numerous public and private organizations and individuals. Id.
40. Shari Seidman Diamond and Jessica Bina analyze federal court data and find that the civil trial
rate is negatively correlated with the caseload, i.e., districts with higher caseloads generally have lower
trial rates. See Diamond & Bina, supra note 30, at 654-56. Although this does not prove that higher
caseloads cause courts to increase the number of non-trial dispositions, that is a plausible interpreta-
tion.
41. Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 20, at 482. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
states:
In addition to conducting trials, judges perform many other case-related functions, including
those related to courtroom activity, research and opinion drafting for motions for summary judg-
ment and other dispositive motions; hearings on sentencing issues; Daubert hearings on expert
witnesses; evidentiary hearings in pro se prisoner and other cases; supervised release and proba-
tion revocation hearings; alternative dispute resolution activities; and settlements. In 2004, a to-
tal of 44 districts operated mediation and arbitration programs that involved more than 14,000
civil cases.
AO, Judicial Business, supra note 30, at 22.
42. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 258-61 (1996). For further discussion of changes in pretrial processing,
including use of ADR, see John Lande, "The Vanishing Trial" Report: An Alternative View of the
Data, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2004, at 19.
43. KAKALIK, supra note 42, at 258-61.
44. See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 590, 592 (2004).
45. During the period 2000-2004, 36.8 percent to 40.0 percent of jurors who went to court to serve
as jurors were not selected or challenged. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, U.S. District
Court - Judicial Caseload Profile, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2004.pl (last
visited Mar. 10, 2006).
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quire equipment, including increasingly sophisticated computers and audio-visual
equipment. Trials also require expensive courtroom space.
Despite the increasing caseloads, the federal courts are cutting expenditures
rather than increasing them. 46 It seems unlikely that funding for the courts will
increase substantially in the foreseeable future, considering the federal budget
generally, as well as the tense relationship between the federal judiciary and Con-
gress.47 The director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
predicts major budget shortfalls despite an extensive cost-containment strategy.48
Thus the federal courts must do more work with fewer resources. To provide a
framework for analyzing problems related to declining trial rates the next part
describes goals for the courts.
III. GOALS OF THE COURTS
The clerks are very concerned about the challenges of providing justice.49
They focus on the overall operation of the courts and, rather than concentrating
particularly on trials, they generally see their goal as the optimal administration of
justice.50 From this perspective, trial is a means to an end-an especially impor-
46. The Chief Justice's 2004 Year-end Report on the Federal Judiciary describes the judiciary's
"funding crisis" as follows:
The continuing uncertainties and delays in the funding process, along with rising fixed costs that
outpace any increased funding from Congress, have required many courts to impose hiring
freezes, furloughs, and reductions in force. In some cases they have had to cut back services
available to the public. During Fiscal Year 2004, this resulted in a 6 percent reduction-l,350
positions-in employees other than judges and the staff who work in their chambers.
William Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States, 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 2-3, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-endl2004year-endreport
.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
To deal with the crisis, the Judicial Conference developed "a comprehensive cost-containment strat-
egy" which
entails a moratorium on some courthouse construction projects; improving workforce efficiency;
a study of basic changes in the Judicial Branch's approach to compensation for non-judges; pro-
moting more effective use of technology; a study of possible program changes to reduce costs in
defender services, court security, probation and pretrial services, and bankruptcy case processing,
among others; and regular examination of court fees to reflect economic changes.
Id. at 2-3. The report states that "[i]mplementing this cost containment strategy will ameliorate but not
end the Judiciary's funding crisis." Id. at 3. See generally, PATRICIA A. GARCIA, FUNDING THE
JUSTICE SYsTEM: How ARE THE COURTS FUNDED? (1998), available at http://www.abanet.org
/abastore/index.cfm?section=main&fm=Product.AddToCart&pid=3460003 (last visited Mar. 10,
2006).
47. See Chief Justice of the United States, supra note 46, at 4-8 (discussing "the strained relationship
between the Congress and the federal Judiciary").
48. According to the director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts:
Unprecedented funding challenges face the Judiciary in FY [fiscal year] 2004 and over the next
several years due to overall budget constraints. For the past two years, the Judiciary has received
funding that was inadequate to meet its needs, and estimates of probable future funding when
compared to estimated needs show a growing gap approaching $848 million by FY 2009.
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, supra note 39, at 4. Government officials some-
times use dire warnings as part of a strategy to advocate for increased funding. Even if this statement
is somewhat exaggerated, it suggests that there is a substantial gap between the cost of normal court
activities and expected appropriations.
49. Clerks Discussion, supra note 8.
50. Id. Similarly, Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil focuses on the administration of justice when
considering effects of integration of ADR into the litigation process. See Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR
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tant one-but it is not an end in itself. One clerk said, "Trials are not our main
business," 51 reflecting the fact that courts do many other important tasks in the
administration of justice. Few of the clerks think that the trial rates are too low. 52
For example, one clerk wrote:
Courts should strive to be full service dispute resolvers. Trials have a
place in the array of services, but not to the exclusion of other devices for
justly ending disputes. If there is or was a methodological hierarchy, it
needs to be ditched. If courts intend to retain relevance and public sup-
port, they must do a better job of responding to needs. 53
Obviously there are widely differing definitions of justice, a huge subject well
beyond the scope of this article.54 In this article, the administration of justice fo-
cuses on court operations that provide: (1) processes and outcomes for litigants
consistent with procedural and substantive legal norms, 55 and (2) proper guidance
to the public about those norms and what people can expect from the courts in
future cases.
25 Years After Pound: Have We Found a Better Way?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 93, 98-108
(2002).
51. Clerks Discussion, supra note 8 (clerk 5).
52. Id. Clerks Discussion, supra note 8.
53. Id. Clerks Follow-up Survey (clerk 1).
54. For a helpful discussion of how different theories of justice can be applied in analyzing dispute
resolution processes, see Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, IfPortia Were a Mediator: An Inquiry
into Justice in Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 157 (2002). Professors Hyman and Love describe
theories of reparative justice, retribution and revenge, distributive justice, justice as a function of
effects on relationships, and procedural justice. Id. at 162-74. For a very thoughtful analysis of how
settlements can produce justice, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is it Anyway?: A Phi-
losophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2687-94 (1995).
See also Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediation and Justice: What Standards Govern?, 6 CARDOzO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 213 (2005) (identifying six elements needed for justice in mediation); Ellen
Waldman, The Concept of Justice in Mediation: A Psychobiography, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
247 (2005) (distinguishing theories of justice based on self-determination and social norms).
55. Litigants in court-connected dispute resolution processes can settle cases under terms that differ
from what courts would order if the cases were tried. In some cases, such as class actions, the courts
must approve the settlements. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). If the law does not require court approval of
settlements, the results may be considered "just" and consistent with legal rules if the process complies
with appropriate norms such as informed consent and avoidance of coercion. See Timothy Hedeen,
Coercion and Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: All Mediations Are Voluntary, But
Some Are More Voluntary Than Others, 26 JusT. Sys. J. 273 (2005); Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing
Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation-Tension Between the Aspirations of a Private Facili-
tative Process and the Reality of Public Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 509, 527-
35 (2004) (analyzing duress and undue influence in mediation); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision
of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 59-78 (2001). In recent years, scholars and practitioners have been paying
greater attention to compliance with process norms. See, e.g., John Lande, How Will Lawyering and
Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 857 (1997) (recommending
a goal of "high-quality consent" defined as where principals make decisions by "considering the situa-
tion sufficiently and without excessive pressure"); John Lande, More Sophisticated Theory, supra note
38, at 325 n.25 (suggesting the term "quality of decision making" because "the same considerations
generally apply regardless of whether the mediations result in agreement"); Welsh, supra, at 79-93
(offering recommendations to protect party self-determination and prevent coercion). For further
discussion, see infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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A. Satisfying Litigants' Interests in the Courts
Although trials represent the symbolic and sometimes glamorous pinnacle of
litigation, litigants often have a greater interest in courts' non-trial activities. In-
deed, for many litigants, a trial judgment is not their ultimate goal and a trial is not
their preferred process to achieve their goals. Rather, most litigants presumably
value trial as a "doomsday machine" 56 with which they can threaten opponents to
gain a settlement on favorable terms, in a process that Galanter calls "litigotia-
tion. ' '57  For litigants, trial courts provide many services with more immediate
practical value than trials. The vast majority of litigants value courts as legitimate
institutions to assume jurisdiction, administer paperwork, adjudicate pretrial dis-
putes, manage the dispute resolution process in an orderly way, and enforce deci-
sions.58 This is very concrete administration of justice.
Courts now provide dispute resolution services in a competitive market. The
courts used to be the "only game in town" for people who needed a formal dispute
resolution process that would produce a legitimate and enforceable resolution.
Courts were like the monopolistic pre-1980s telephone company parodied by Lily
Tomlin's character Ernestine the operator, who said, "We're the phone company.
We don't have to care." After AT&T was dismantled, the phone market became
very competitive and phone companies "had to care" to get and retain customers.
Similarly, the courts cannot assume that disputants will choose their services to
handle their disputes--or to handle the entirety of the disputes. Parties can choose
binding arbitration or private judging and largely keep their cases out of the court
system. They may sometimes choose between federal and state courts based on
56. See Howard Bedlin & Paul Nejelski, Unsettling Issues About Settling Civil Litigation: Examin-
ing "Doomsday Machines," "Quick Looks" and Other Modest Proposals, 68 JUDICATURE 9, 26-28
(1984). Professor Samuel Gross described it this way:
[A]voiding trial is a central goal of courts and litigators alike. Some marginal figures-
academics, and that quaint old-fashioned breed, the trial lawyer-may see a down side to this
quest, but this is a minority position.... [Albove [a] functional minimal level (whatever that is)
the dominant-the nearly exclusive-view is that trials are an unnecessary cost, a deadweight
loss to be avoided.
Samuel R. Gross, Vanishing Trials, Civil and Criminal: Global Cost Cutting, and Local Politics 3
(Dec. 12-14, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (footnote omitted).
57. Though litigants and lawyers probably wouldn't recognize the term "litigotiation"-which
Galanter coined to mean "the strategic pursuit of a settlement through mobilizing the court process"-
that is what they usually expect and want. See Marc Galanter, World of Deals: Using Negotiation to
Teach About Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984). People who feel aggrieved generally
would prefer to avoid invoking a third party such as a court and typically go to court only if avoiding
the problem or talking it out is unsatisfactory. See Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do
Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 151, 171-76 (1984). Although
some disputants undoubtedly begin litigation with fantasies of spectacular public vindication in a
"Perry Mason moment" at trial, these fantasies often subside as trial looms, when they increasingly
appreciate the costs and risks of trial.
58. Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 20, at 533-34. Galanter compiled data about the stages of
disposition of federal civil cases between 1962 and 2002, showing increasing pretrial engagement of
the courts in cases filed in the court. Id. By 2002, 83.9 percent of cases terminated with some court
action. Id. This included 74.1 percent of cases terminated with some court action before pretrial, 8.0
percent with court action during or after pretrial, and 1.8 percent during or after trial. Id. One may
assume that these court actions had some value to many, perhaps most, litigants.
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which is likely to provide process advantages such as the ability to manage the
cases, informality, convenience of procedural rules, and cost.59
Understandably, some courts view litigants as "customers"60 and have a
strong interest in providing a range of services to satisfy consumer demand.6'
Some litigants now file suits in court in a more sophisticated version of litigotia-
tion than when Galanter coined the term in 1984. Twenty years ago, settlement
typically resulted from unassisted negotiation between lawyers or sometimes from
court settlement conferences. Today, litigants regularly choose from a broader
range of assisted dispute resolution processes, especially mediation and judicial
settlement conferences. 62 Many courts regularly provide or broker ADR services
in addition to administering pretrial procedures and trials. 63 From a market per-
spective, courts would not necessarily define these cases as a loss of "business"
due to reduction of trial rates and might, instead, consider these as an increase in
business satisfying litigants' needs.
59. See Melissa Burkland et al., 2004-2005 Assessment of the Services of the United States District
Court for the District of North Dakota, 81 N.D. L. REv. 233, 256 (2005) (survey of attorneys identify-
ing various advantages of state courts causing attorneys not to file case in federal court).
60. See Western District, Strategic Plan, supra note 14, at 16 (setting goal of "maintain[ing] high
level of service to public with diminishing budget limitations," including initiative to "provide timely
and knowledgeable customer service"). The U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota ar-
ranged for a survey of lawyers to assess the Court's services. The survey included numerous aspects
of interaction with the court, including many involving the clerk's office and pretrial activities in
addition to trial. Many more attorneys responded "not applicable" to questions about trial than they
did about dealing with the clerks or the pretrial process. See Burkland, supra note 59, at 258-62. A
market orientation is reflected by the characterization that the court provided "pretrial services" and
"trial services." Id. at 238-40.
61. Texas Supreme Court Justice Nathan Hecht described the situation this way. "The civil jury
trial, as a dispute-resolution product, is losing its market. To recover, it needs more than a better
advertising campaign. Its costs must be slashed and its taste improved." Hecht, supra note 29, at 182.
Some people focus on the courts' role in performing valuable public functions. See, e.g., Fiss, supra
note 17. These people would disapprove of courts competing for customers as if courts' produce
services just like any other goods or services in the market. One can appreciate the essential and
unique nature of courts' functions in our society and also recognize the reality that courts act in a
market where they do not have a monopoly on dispute resolution services. Id. For a description of the
private dispute resolution market in a large metropolitan area, see ELIZABETH ROLPH ET AL., ESCAPING
THE COURTHOUSE: PRIVATE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN LOS ANGELES (1994).
62. Under the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, each federal district court must adopt
local rules implementing its own ADR program. 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2001). According to a prelimi-
nary review of local court rules, general orders, and plans promulgated by the district courts, sixty-two
courts authorize mediation, thirty-two courts authorize settlement conferences, twenty-one courts
authorize arbitration, eighteen courts authorize early neutral evaluation, and nine courts provide only a
general authorization to use ADR. Stienstra, supra note 38, at 2-3 (unpublished document prepared for
the Conference on Court ADR Research, on file with author). The federal courts do not regularly
collect data on referrals to ADR processes. Forty-nine of the ninety-four district courts applied for
ADR funding for fiscal year 2005 and the applications include statistics about the numbers of cases
referred to ADR. Of the 24,835 cases included in these applications, 15,555 (63 percent) were referred
to mediation, 3,317 (13 percent) were referred to the multi-option program for selecting ADR proc-
esses in the Northern District of California, 2,588 (10 percent) were referred to arbitration, 1,608 (6
percent) were referred to settlement conferences, 1,332 (5 percent) were referred to early neutral
evaluation, and the rest were referred to other processes. Id. at 8 (based on information compiled and
provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts). The accuracy of these statistics is not clear
and they may significantly understate the number of settlement conferences, especially in courts not
applying for funds, as some people do not consider settlement conferences as ADR. See supra note 38.
63. For a recent symposium on court-connected ADR, see Symposium, Making Dispute Resolution
Work, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 253 (2005).
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This market perspective is consistent with individualistic cultural and political
values underlying the U.S. legal system, in which courts generally react to litigant
initiative rather than taking the initiative themselves.64 These same values affect
lawyer-client relationships, in which lawyers advance clients' interests by using
the most advantageous procedures available. 6 5 These market and cultural values
support the perceived mission of many court administrators of satisfying litigants'
interests consistent with the courts' responsibilities under the law. One clerk illus-
trated this by saying, "the parties do what they decide to do, which is fine as long
as the courts don't create barriers." 66 The way that courts manage litigation does,
in fact, create some barriers for litigants. Federal courts use pretrial conferences
to address various procedural matters such as defining and narrowing issues for
trial, setting deadlines for discovery and motions, exploring settlement and ADR
options, and setting the groundrules for trial.67 To wisely manage their resources,
courts must balance their interest in satisfying litigants' needs with the courts'
institutional needs. Although courts might like, in theory, to give all litigants their
proverbial "day in court"-perhaps even with a jury guaranteed by federal and
state constitutions-this is obviously impractical and no one seriously suggests
that. One judge put it this way, "Litigants are entitled to their day in court, but
they are not entitled to somebody else's day in court.,
68
B. Satisfying Society's Interests in the Courts
Professor David Luban catalogues a variety of public goods produced through
the court system including opportunities for intervention by persons not party to
lawsuits, discovery and publication of important facts, facilitation and enforce-
ment of private settlements, development of legal rules and Xprecedents, and struc-
tural transformation of large public and private institutions.6  Though trials-and
sometimes the threat of trial-can promote these goals, the legal system can ac-
complish them without trials in many situations. In particular, trials are not
needed to gain benefits of non-parties' intervention in cases, pretrial discovery of
information, or facilitation and enforcement of private settlements.
64. See Robert Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary Inquiry, 19 L. &
SOc. INQUIRY 1, 7-11 (1994).
65. Ethical rules require lawyers to "reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the
client's objectives are to be accomplished." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a) (2) (2002).
A comment to Rule 2.1 states that when a matter is likely to involve litigation, "it may be necessary
under Rule 1.4 to inform the client of forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable
alternatives to litigation." Id. R. 2.1 cmt. 5.
66. Clerks Initial Survey, supra note 8 (clerk 1). The clerk made this statement in conversation and
presumably would have qualified it to say that courts should not create inappropriate barriers.
67. See generally WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER & ALAN HIRSCH, THE ELEMENTS OF CASE
MANAGEMENT: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2d ed. 2006). Case management is intended to help
courts use limited resources efficiently and to help litigants make appropriate litigation decisions. For
a seminal critique, see Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982).
68. Celeste F. Bremer, Magistrate Judge, S.D. Iowa, Remarks at the Program on Alternative Dispute
Resolution for the Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference (Oct. 20, 2005).
69. See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622-26
(1995). See also Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through ADR,
11 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 241,247-51 (1996) (describing benefits of public dispute resolution).
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Trials certainly can perform important social functions of publicizing facts,
developing common law rules and precedents, and producing judgments that pro-
mote institutional transformation. Galanter writes, "[t]he trial is a site of 'deep
accountability' where facts are exposed and responsibility assessed, a place where
the ordinary politics of personal interaction are suspended, the fictions that shield
us from embarrassment and moral judgment are stripped away." 70 Trials also can
satisfy the public interest in providing opportunities for checks on government
power, catharsis in dealing with events of public significance, and demonstration
that the system of justice works. 7' These outcomes are also possible to a consid-
erable extent through other means. For example, although trials provide dramatic
means of publicizing facts, information gathered during discovery can be publi-
cized through other processes, including filings in public court records, non-trial
adjudications, press conferences, legislative hearings, and publications by gov-
ernment agencies and private entities. Many cases do not involve newsworthy
facts and trials may not be a particularly effective means of publicizing them.
News media have limited "news holes" to fill and merely increasing the number
of trials might not significantly increase the amount of publicity about truly
newsworthy facts. Certainly, many non-trial processes are less dramatic and may
not be widely publicized. However, some settlements and non-trial adjudications
do provide opportunities for public accountability and vindication of public val-
ues. Although many settlements are kept private, a substantial number are publi-
cized including some settlements of major public interest.72
Certainly some trials lead to development of new case law. Appellate courts
also develop new law based on cases decided on summary judgment motions,
which may actually be more efficient in generating new law. The issues on appeal
70. Galanter, World Without Trials, supra note 19, at 22. This assumes that trials work as intended.
Sometimes they do not. Trials promote what Professor Jonathan Cohen calls "the culture of legal
denial," in which lawyers seek partisan victory rather than truth or justice. See Jonathan R. Cohen, The
Culture of Legal Denial, 84 NEB. L. REv. 247 (2005). Although this culture also affects pretrial proc-
esses including negotiation, there is much greater incentive for adversarial approaches and denial at
trial. Our adversary system is premised on the assumption that justice will result from partisan proce-
dures adjudicated by impartial judges. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS'
ETHICS 65-66 (1990) (advocating the premise "Let justice be done-that is, for my client let justice be
done- though the heavens fall," positing the existence of an opposing counsel and impartial judge to
make sure that the heavens do not fall unless justice requires it). Experience shows that this is no
guarantee of justice as trial procedures can be used to create misleading impressions and the ultimate
results may depend on the litigants' resources and their lawyers' capabilities. See generally Marc
Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974).
71. See Robert M. Ackerman, Vanishing Trial, Vanishing Community? The Potential Effect of the
Vanishing Trial on America's Social Capital, 2006 J. Disp. Resol. 165; Paul Butler, The Case for
Trials: Considering the Intangibles, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 627, 629-30 (2004); Stephan
Landsman, So What? Possible Implications of the Vanishing Trial Phenomenon, I J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 973, 974-79 (2004).
72. News media often publish stories about settlements. See, e.g., Kyle Whitmire, HealthSouth Will
Settle Investor Suits Over Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2006, at C6 (describing $445 million settlement
for accounting fraud). Many legal newspapers routinely publish information about cases that settle as
well as those that are tried. See, e.g., Verdicts and Settlements, RECORDER (San Francisco), Dec. 20,
2005, at 5 (including reports of settlements of $22.6 million in a toxic tort case and $150,000 in a
motor vehicle case). For a listing of about sixty sources providing information about settlements, see
Blanca Fromm, Bringing Settlement out of the Shadows: Information about Settlement in an Age of
Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REv. 663, 708-41 (2001).
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of summary judgment motions are purely legal issues, as the appellate courts base
their decisions on a clear set of facts73 whereas some trial judgments turn on dis-
puted factual disputes. Professor Stephen Burbank identifies potential problems
with case law based on summary judgment, which may be "arid, divorced from
the full factual account that has in the past given our law life and the capacity to
grow."7 4 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that case law derived from trials
often is superior to that based on summary judgment motions, it is not clear how
much value would be added to the common law by having a larger percentage of
precedential appellate decisions based on trial judgments. It is also worth noting
that appellate decisions are not vanishing, considering that the total number of
federal trials appealed to conclusion has been increasing 75 and the number of
pages of federal opinions published each year has more than doubled since 1962.76
Trials can lead to significant transformations of social institutions, but the
same results sometimes can be achieved through settlement. Indeed, settlement
offers the potential for even greater transformation as litigants have the power to
agree to arrangements beyond the courts' remedial authority.77
There should be no doubt that having trials produces considerable social
benefit. As a policy matter, however, the question is not whether to have trials.
Rather, policy issues focus on such matters as whether to have more or fewer
trials, what kinds of cases and litigants should get to trial, who should make those
decisions, how to design litigation and trial procedures to maximize the benefits
and minimize the problems, etc. Concern about loss of social benefits due to de-
clining trial rates requires close analysis of whether the costs of conducting more
trials would be worth any additional net benefit.78 Such a detailed analysis is
beyond the scope of this article. The points here are that: (1) we should not sim-
ply assume that trials are the only means of producing certain benefits, and (2)
when limitations of resources require careful decisionmaking, it is important to
73. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992) (appellate
courts review appeals of summary judgments based on facts presented by the nonmoving party).
74. Burbank, supra note 44, at 624-26.
75. See Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further
Exploration of Anti-PlaintiffAppellate Outcomes, 1 J. ENPiRiCAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 669 (2004) (find-
ing that the total number of federal trials appealed to conclusion rose from about 7,100 in 1987 to
about 8,300 in 1995). It is not clear how many of these appeals resulted in published opinions. Judge
Boyce Martin cites several studies showing that approximately 60 to 90 percent of appellate decisions
are unpublished. See Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177,
188-89 (1999). Given these rates of non-publication, increasing the number of trials would be an
inefficient way to generate additional appellate case law.
76. See Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 20, at 506.
77. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 54, at 2672-78 (contrasting limited "remedial imagination" and
authority of courts with settlement, which "offers the opportunity to craft solutions that do not com-
promise, but offer greater expression of the variety of remedial possibilities"); Jeffrey R. Seul, Settling
Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV. 881 (2004) (arguing that use of deliberative dispute resolution
processes in significant cases of deep moral disagreement can benefit litigants and society in ways that
litigation cannot).
78. The additional net benefit of trials is the additional benefit achieved by trials compared with
other methods of accomplishing the goals, taking into account the costs and problems resulting from
the various dispute processes. The accounting terminology is not meant to imply that this could be
readily calculated quantitatively. Rather, it is used to suggest an analytical approach of comparing
benefits of different procedural regimes.
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analyze various means of accomplishing the courts' goals. The following parts
provide a framework for such an analysis in the context of reduced trial rates.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF REDUCED TRIAL RATES
A. Perceived Benefits of Reduced Trial Rates
The Eighth Circuit clerks were asked about their perceptions of the benefits
of recent changes in trial patterns in their courts. The trial rates in their courts
generally seemed to be declining, at least for civil cases.79 The most common set
of responses regarding perceived benefits referred to the ability to invest more
time in other cases and court business. For example, one of the clerks said, "My
judges believe that the decline affords them more time to devote to substantive
issues of the law, improved decision-making, and an overall improvement in the
work of the law clerks." 80 Another clerk suggested that the reduced civil trial
calendar helps relieve pressure to handle the criminal cases. 81 A related set of
comments referred to the ability to handle cases more quickly, routinely, and effi-
ciently. One clerk said that it was easier to train his staff because the "cases tend
to look pretty much alike and do not raise many unusual twists and turns."
82
Some also see a change in the attitudes of attorneys, reflecting greater interest in
settlement.
83
Many litigants terminating litigation before trial are also likely to benefit by
avoiding some risk, saving litigation costs, and resolving the cases sooner than if
the cases were tried.84 It seems likely that in some, perhaps many, of these non-
tried cases, litigants achieved such other benefits as greater satisfaction with the
process and results, greater privacy, and reduced damage to relationships. This
article focuses primarily on possible problems caused by reduced trial rates and
thus does not provide a detailed analysis of the benefits.
79. Most of the clerks reported that the trial rates in their courts had declined in civil cases in the
prior ten years or so and none reported that the civil trial rate increased. Clerks Initial Survey, supra
note 8 (clerks 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9). Three clerks reported that the criminal trial rate had been stable or
increased. Id. One should interpret these reports cautiously. Although many of the clerks provided
some statistics, there was no effort to make uniform and valid assessments of the trial rates in these
courts.
80. Id. (clerk 9).
81. Id. (clerk 8). The pressures from the criminal docket may inhibit civil litigants from trying cases
if they find that it takes too long to get a trial date or if they risk getting "bumped" off the trial calendar
if a criminal case takes priority. If these events occur, the reduced civil trial rate reflects a problem of
insufficient judicial capacity.
82. Id.
83. Id. (clerks 2, 5, 9). It is hard to separate how much lawyers' increased interest in settlement is a
cause or an effect of changing trial rates. Moreover, some may not see this change as positive.
84. The substantive results might or might not be better for various litigants than if the cases were
tried. In assessing the substantive results of trial, one should adjust for extra litigation costs that would
be needed to try the case and other considerations affecting litigants' assessments.
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B. Perceived Problems Caused by Reduced Trial Rates
I also asked the clerks about problems caused by the pattern of trial rates in
their courts. 85 The largest response-from about half of the clerks-was that it
had not caused any problems in their courts.86 Some of the responses may be
based on clerks' philosophies about the courts' mission. For example, one clerk
said:
I have a hard time viewing the overall decline in the number of trials as a
bad thing for the public or the justice system .... No one would bemoan
a decline in the number of surgeries required to cure cancer if less inva-
sive alternatives were effectively treating those patients. In that same
vein, the decline in trials should generally be viewed as a positive devel-
opment rather than as a sign of a failing justice system. 87
Several clerks raised questions whether the reduced civil trial rate has left
lawyers with reduced trial practice skills.88 In addition, some lawyers reportedly
are over-preparing for trials that will not take place. One clerk said, "lawyers and
85. The clerks had not analyzed this question systematically, so their responses reflected their gen-
eral impressions. Confident assessments of the problems would require careful study and the clerks'
responses are useful in identifying issues for further research. Given the variations between courts,
particular courts interested in identifying and addressing problems related to reduced trial rates may
want to conduct their own inquiries about the circumstances in their areas. See infra notes 30, at 110-
11 and accompanying text.
86. Clerks Initial Survey, supra note 8 (clerks 4, 5, 6, 8).
87. Id. (clerk 1). This view is similar to the general perspective that Gross and Syverud describe as
follows:
A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system of justice, we know
that trial is not only an uncommon method of resolving disputes, but a disfavored one. With
some notable exceptions, lawyers, judges, and commentators agree that pretrial settlement is al-
most always cheaper, faster, and better than trial. Much of our civil procedure is justified by the
desire to promote settlement and avoid trial. More important, the nature of our civil process
drives parties to settle so as to avoid the costs, delays, and uncertainties of trial, and, in many
cases, to agree upon terms that are beyond the power or competence of courts to dictate. These
are powerful forces, and they produce settlement in a very high proportion of litigated disputes.
Once in a while, however, the process fails and a case goes to trial.
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the
Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
88. Clerks Initial Survey, supra note 8 (clerks 1, 6, 7). This is consistent with reports of others'
concerns about lawyers' diminished trial skills due to limited trial experience. Professor Kevin
McMunigal writes that
if trials are infrequent, costly, and subject to great delays, we should expect to incur a number of
costs relating to lawyers: decreased advocacy skills, distorted settlements, frivolous claims, dis-
covery abuse, and increased psychological strain on lawyers. Scarcity of trial experience threat-
ens to exact these costs by undermining the abilities of lawyers and by creating incentives that
make lawyers more likely to disserve both clients and the legal system. In other words, trials and
their associated processes generate a number of benefits in terms of the competence of lawyers as
well as the incentive structure under which they operate.
Kevin C. McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication on Litigation,
37 UCLA L. Rev. 833, 838 (1990). See also Daniel D. Blink, Ethics, Evidence, and the Modern Ad-
versary Trial, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1, 56 (2006) (suggesting that inexperienced trial lawyers may
be both a cause and effect of declining number of jury trials); Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 20,
at 521-22; Landsman, supra note 71, at 973 (arguing that young lawyers find it increasingly difficult to
get trial experience).
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litigants behave as if there really will be a trial when all is said and done. So in-
stead of managing a dispute for settlement, they conduct the litigation as if the
chances of a trial are quite high. 89
A possible related problem is that some judges may not have enough trial ex-
perience, due to limited trial experience in legal practice and on the bench. 9°
Moreover, the number and types of cases on the trial docket which, combined
with other factors, 91 may make it harder to attract and retain good judges as some
judges enjoy trying cases and would like to try more cases.92
Two clerks speculated that reduced trial rates may create inappropriate mes-
sages for litigants and the public about the courts' willingness to try cases. One
said, "a problem may exist if litigants ... do not perceive the trial option as a vi-
able choice available to them." 93 Another said, "[m]aybe [there is] a perception
problem given that the public often clamors for 'getting their day in Court' and
our systems are designed to keep Court hours to a minimum."94 One clerk ex-
pressed concern that court-connected mediation conveys the message that litigants
should settle their cases because juries are so unpredictable and trial is a bad and
expensive process.
95
Another problem is a surplus of courtroom space in some courts, as the facili-
ties were designed assuming that there would be more trials and that every judge
needs a courtroom. Empty courtrooms can create public misperceptions that the
89. Professor Julie Macfarlane makes a similar observation: "Lawyers generally conduct litigation
as if they are going to trial but they almost never do." Julie Macfarlane, Will Changing the Process
Change the Outcome? The Relationship Between Procedural and Systemic Change, 65 LA. L. REv.
1487, 1489 (2005). One possible explanation for such behavior is that some lawyers are insecure
about their trial skills and feel a need to over-prepare in case a particular matter happens to go to trial.
Another possible explanation is that some lawyers are taking advantage of their clients by providing as
much justice as they can afford even if it is more than they need.
90. See Ad Hoc Committee on the Future of the Civil Trial of the American College of Trial Law-
yers, supra note 29, at 415; Landsman, supra note 71, at 973-74 (arguing that judges' lack of trial
experience undermines their confidence in the trials, leading them to try to avoid trying cases).
91. Judges' salaries have been the source of long-standing concern. Chief Justice John Roberts
writes that, "Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote often about the need to raise judicial pay-going so far as
to say in his 2002 Year-End Report that he felt at risk of 'beating a dead horse.' ... If Congress gave
judges a raise of 30 percent tomorrow, judges would-after adjusting for inflation-be making about
what judges made in 1969." John Roberts, Chief Justice of the United States, 2005 YEAR-END
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, available at http:llwww.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/2005year-endreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). In addition, Senate confirmation processes
can be grueling and drawn-out, leaving judicial nominees "twisting in the wind" for a long time with
their legal practices in limbo. See John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal Judi-
cial Appointments Process Under Bill Clinton and George W Bush, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1
(2003).
92. Clerks Initial Survey, supra note 8 (clerks 1, 2, 7, 9). Given reduced trial rates and increased
pretrial activity, one clerk speculated that lawyers who want to become judges these days may have a
greater desire and/or willingness to perform the managerial aspects of the job. Id. Clerks Discussion
(clerk 1). Although some judges love trying cases, other judges prefer different judicial tasks. Profes-
sor Paul Butler describes a judge he clerked for as "happiest in her business suit, at her desk in cham-
bers, in conference with trial attorneys, cajoling and imploring and yelling. She was never thrilled to
find herself draped in a robe, in a courtroom, sitting on high." Butler, supra note 71, at 627.
93. Clerks Initial Survey, supra note 8 (clerk 6).
94. Id. (clerk 5).
95. Id. (clerk 7).
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courts are not busy doing important work.96 When courtrooms are used only in-
termittently, courtroom equipment may require extra testing and service.
97
I asked clerks whether the reduction in number of trial verdicts seemed to
make it harder for lawyers to settle cases because they have a harder time predict-
ing how local judges and juries would decide cases. 98 The clerks generally did not
have an opinion about this. 99 One clerk doubted that this has been a problem and
noted that the few cases that do go to trial are, by definition, very unusual and thus
not necessarily indicative of likely outcomes of other cases.1°° Even though tried
cases are not representative of cases filed, 10' many litigants nonetheless use trial
verdicts in setting their settlement strategies.102 The limited amount of informa-
tion on prior trial verdicts would not necessarily decrease the litigants' ability to
settle-indeed increased uncertainty may stimulate some litigants to settle so that
they can limit the risks of unfavorable trial judgments. The resulting settlements
may be considered as less just or of poorer quality, however, to the extent that one
96. Id. (clerk 5).
97. Many courthouses are designed so that each judge has his or her own courtroom. Although
courtrooms are used for pretrial hearings, in some courts the courtrooms are under-utilized because the
focus of judges' work has shifted to various pretrial activities that do not require courtrooms. Ironi-
cally, the under-utilization itself can increase costs as it takes more effort to stage non-routine events.
For example, courts may need technicians to test equipment before each trial. One clerk made the
analogy that it is a lot harder on average to throw a party once in a while than to do it every day. Id.;
Clerks Discussion (clerk 8).
98. Galanter writes that the "signals and markers that provide guidance for settlements derive in-
creasingly from pronouncements that are not connected with an authoritative determination of facts.
What does this do to the clarity of signalsT' Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 20, at 526. Dia-
mond and Bina argue that "it is hard to challenge the value of trial verdicts as benchmarks against
which would-be litigants and their attorneys can evaluate claims and consider how to resolve them
short of trial." Diamond & Bina, supra note 30, at 658.
99. Clerks Discussion, supra note 8.
100. Id. (clerk 1).
101. Gross and Syverud state that "[s]cholars are unanimous in recognizing that trials are not repre-
sentative of the mass of litigated disputes." Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil
Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1996). Gross and Syverud
conducted a detailed analysis of California civil cases that went to jury trial and found that
the few cases that do go to jury trial-perhaps 2 percent of civil filings, and less than 1 percent of
all civil claims-are very different from the mass of cases that settle. They are typically high-
risk, all-or-nothing cases, cases with unusual facts or intransigent parties, cases that defy com-
promise. Their outcomes, by comparison with ordinary work-a-day settlement cases, are costly,
unpredictable, and sometimes bizarre. Because jury trials and jury verdicts are the most visible
products of litigation, these extreme and unrepresentative cases distort public perception of the
administration of civil justice. In the process, they perpetuate the image of litigation as terror,
which helps drive all but the most hopeless disputes out of court, which means that any general
policy based on what happens in those cases that are tried will be misconceived.
Id. at 63. See also Kent D. Syverud, ADR and the Decline of the American Civil Jury, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1935, 1944 (1997) (referring to litigants taking cases to trial as "freaks"); Margo Schlanger &
Denise lieberman, Using Court Records for Research, Teaching, and Policymaking: The Civil Rights
Litigation Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (describing why published opinions
and settlement and verdict reporters are incomplete and unrepresentative data sources regarding trial
outcomes).
102. Gross and Syverud write:
for practitioners, trials are important primarily because they influence the terms of settlement for
the mass of cases that are not tried; trials cast a major part of the legal shadow within which pri-
vate bargaining takes place. Trials have this standard-setting effect despite the fact that they are
not typical of the cases in which their results are used as guides for settlement.
Gross & Syverud, supra note 101, at 4 (footnotes omitted).
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believes that settlement should approximate trial outcomes as opposed to satisfy-
ing litigants needs or achieving other goals.'
0 3
Although this catalog of potential benefits and problems is based on the im-
pressions and speculations of a small number of court administrators, their views
are quite plausible and worth considering when analyzing what the courts might
realistically do to advance the cause of justice. The next part analyzes some pos-
sible strategies to address problems that the clerks discussed.
V. POSSIBLE STRATEGIES FOR PROVIDING JUSTICE IN A COURT SYSTEM
WITH REDUCED TRIAL RATES
Trial courts' functions have expanded in various ways during recent decades.
Traditionally, trial courts' main role was to adjudicate at trials.1 4 Although courts
have conducted pretrial activities for quite some time, in recent decades the courts
have been doing so more self-consciously, extensively, and systematically. 0 5 In
recent decades, trial courts have increasingly adopted local rules. 106 As case refer-
ral managers, courts encourage and sometimes order litigants to use ADR proc-
esses. 10 7 Courts are also involved in various court and justice planning activities,
typically involving the bar and lay communities.' 08  Presumably many courts'
initiatives began sporadically and on an ad hoc basis in various localities and be-
came more widely adopted and institutionalized over time.
The combination of declining trial rates and tightening budgets provides
courts with an opportunity to refine their role in the world of dispute resolution.
In this refined role, courts could add a function as self-conscious promoters of
local dispute resolution systems extending beyond the immediate reach of the
courts. This expanded role provides an opportunity for courts to enhance the pub-
lic service they provide. It also carries real risks described in this part; thus,
courts should exercise caution.'
°9
Although it can be tempting to make strong universal recommendations for
all courts, analysts should resist that temptation for several reasons. First, courts'
103. See generally Fiss, supra note 17.
104. See Resnik, supra note 67, at 380-86.
105. See Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE
257 (1986); Resnik, supra note 67.
106. See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence,
and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2020-26 (1989) (discussing report of
Local Rules Project of the Judicial Conference of the United States which found a "proliferation" of
local rules, including "approximately 5,000 local rules, not including many 'subrules,' standing orders
and standard operating procedures").
107. See Roselle L. Wissler, The Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases,
22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 55, 63 (2004).
108. See Coalition for Justice, ABA, Summary of State and Local Justice Improvement Activities
(2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/justice/03summary/execsummary.html (Last visited Mar.
10, 2006) [hereinafter Coalition for Justice]. For illustrations of these initiatives, see infra notes 184-
86 and accompanying text.
109. Courts vary in the extent to which they currently undertake these activities as well as in the level
of court leaders' motivation to do so in the future. Thus, courts may range from the most traditional
roles with little interest in changing to highly innovative courts with great interest in continuing inno-
vation. Most courts are probably somewhere in between. Although the term "innovation" has a posi-
tive connotation, this article does not advocate innovation as an end in itself, but only to advance
legitimate public goals through well-designed policies.
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trial patterns vary widely 1 ° and some courts' trial rates may not be considered as
too low or as declining seriously. Second, the identification of problems and
analysis of policy options in this article rest on a very thin empirical base, primar-
ily brief surveys and conversations with a small number of court clerks. Much
more detailed analysis would be needed to make definite recommendations with
legitimate confidence. Most importantly, courts are not like interchangeable me-
chanical systems in which technicians can install fungible parts. Much depends
on local culture, including perceptions, beliefs, and values of key stakeholders,
especially judges and the lawyers who regularly practice in those courts. Obvi-
ously a court whose stakeholders support a given policy is more likely to succeed
in implementing it than a court whose stakeholders oppose the same policy.
Moreover, the process of considering, designing, and implementing a policy may
affect its success. Thus a court that carefully consults its stakeholders and crafts a
policy addressing the stakeholders' interests is more likely to be successful than a
court imposing that same policy without such consultation. Courts concerned
about problems related to changing trial patterns should use system design proc-
esses to develop policies tailored to the needs of their local court communities.11 '
A. Give Litigants a Real Choice of Disputing Procedures Including Trial
Courts could respond to changing trial patterns by doing nothing, i.e., nothing
different than the status quo. Many of the clerks perceived no problems with the
current pattern of trial rates in their courts, suggesting the wisdom of the "if it
ain't broke, don't fix it" philosophy. Indeed, some would say that the system not
only ain't broke, but it is doing precisely what court leaders have been advocating
in recent decades, namely helping litigants resolve cases efficiently without going
to trial and arguably producing practical outcomes as good as or better than trial
verdicts. Reducing the number of trials not only provides savings to litigants in
cases resolved without trial; it also frees court resources to invest in other cases
and court business. From this perspective, abandoning policies that promote pre-
trial resolution would be tantamount to surrendering after achieving victory.
The appropriateness of this strategy would depend on making sure that the
courts do not create inappropriate barriers to going to trial. One clerk said, "So
long as the decision about foregoing trial in favor of a voluntary disposition is
freely made by the parties, it represents a healthier and more rational approach to
disputing."'" 2  Some pressure in negotiation is inevitable and often desirable.
Litigants may not make reasonable decisions--or any decision-without some
pressure. Excessive pressure to settle, however, undermines litigants' choice of
going to trial. There are persistent reports of excessive pressure by judges and
110. See supra note 30.
111. For description of methods of court system design, see John Lande, Using Dispute System De-
sign Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50
UCLA L. REv. 69, 108-18, 149 n.364 (2002). The Federal Judicial Center and the American Bar
Association Section of Dispute Resolution offer technical assistance to help federal and state courts
design and modify their dispute resolution programs. See also Gina Viola Brown, A Community of
Court ADR Programs: How Court-Based ADR Programs Help Each Other Survive and Thrive, 26
JUST. SYS. J. 327 (2005).
112. Clerks Initial Survey, supra note 8 (clerk 1).
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court-appointed mediators in some cases that undermine litigants' perceptions of
the justice of the process. 13 The courts are responsible for monitoring and mini-
mizing these problems."14
B. Routinely Collect and Disseminate Data on Negotiation and Settlement
Courts could provide more systematic information to guide litigants in set-
tling cases. Historically, much of the courts' impact has been through "radiating"
signals that influence private negotiation, according to Galanter:
Courts contribute to the settlement of disputes less by imposing authori-
tative resolutions and more by pattern setting, by distribution of bargain-
ing counters, and by mediation. Courts produce effects that radiate
widely: rulings on motions, imposition of sanctions and damage awards
113. See supra note 55. This is not to suggest that litigants are coerced in most cases. See Wissler,
supra note 107, at 65 (citing studies indicating that parties in mediation generally do not feel that the
mediators pressured them to settle). For example, in a study of mediation in nine Ohio courts, Wissler
found that "[m]ost of the parties said they were not pressured by the mediator (80 percent) or by people
other than the mediator (85 percent) to accept a settlement." Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected
Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP.
RESOL. 641, 661 (2002). In a non-trivial minority of cases, however, the parties did fecl pressured.
Up to 8 percent of parties said that they felt pressured by mediators and up to 5 percent said that they
felt pressured by others. E-mails from Roselle Wissler to author (Mar. 18, 2006 5:04 PM, Mar. 20,
2006 9:36 AM) (on file with author) (noting that percentages varied in different courts). Wissler found
that parties were more likely to feel pressured to settle when mediators expressed their views of the
case and especially when they recommended a particular settlement. Wissler, supra, at 684-85. These
findings do not show, however, that expression of opinions or recommendations necessarily lead to
perceptions of being pressured. Id. If litigants request mediators to provide recommendations, pre-
sumably the litigants would not feel inappropriately or excessively pressured. See generally Marjorie
Corman Aaron, Evaluation in Mediation, in MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES 267-305 (Dwight Golann
ed., 1996).
114. A proposed new rule in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct states "A judge may encourage
parties to a proceeding and their lawyers to settle matters in dispute, but shall not act in a manner that
coerces any party into settlement." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, Rule 2.09(B) (Final
Draft Report Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/finaldraftreport.html
(last visited Mar. 10, 2006). A comment to that rule emphasizes the importance of protecting the right
to trial. "The right to be heard is an essential component of a fair and impartial system of justice.
Substantive rights of litigants can be protected only if procedures protecting the right to be heard are
respected." Id. Cmt. I. Similarly, Standard I of the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators.
states, "A mediator shall conduct a mediation based on the principle of party self-determination. Self-
determination is the act of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced decision in which each party makes free
and informed choices as to process and outcome." MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS
(2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfinal-
05.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
The provisions in the Model Rule and Model standards are appropriate statements of principle but are
unlikely in themselves to reduce coercion because it is hard to define coercion (which is not defined in
these provisions) and many people believe that some degree of pressure is acceptable and even desir-
able. See Welsh, supra note 55, at 59-78. In addition to adopting such rules, courts should consider
designing litigation and settlement processes to minimize such abuses. Rules prohibiting coercion or
bad faith are more likely to be effective in that context. See Lande, supra note 111.
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become signals and sources of counters used for bargaining and regula-
tion in many settings.
15
The courts' trial decisions, which radiate most publicly, are unrepresentative
of the general population of legal cases and thus are problematic as the primary
basis for decisionmaking in later negotiations." 6 Courts that regularly conduct
settlement conferences produce signals that involve a larger number of more rep-
resentative cases."l 7 However, the results of settlement conferences normally are
not published, so these signals are relatively weak and fuzzy. Because litigants do
not have clear and reliable signals about prior settlements, they typically rely,
instead, on personal experience, folklore-like information, and occasional pub-
lished reports of settlements."
8
With a relatively modest investment, courts could create substantial public
value by systematically collecting and disseminating information about settle-
ments. Although people have suggested this for quite some time, 19 few research-
ers or courts have been willing and able to collect such data. One exception is the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.' 20  Magistrate judges in
that court complete a simple one-page form after settlement conferences where the
litigants reach agreement. The form calls for data about case type; type of allega-
tion and length of employment (in employment cases); settlement terms (including
general information about non-monetary terms); itemization of damages sought
and plaintiff's initial demand; defendant's initial offer; stage of litigation; and date
of settlement.'21 The data is kept confidential. 22 The court collected data on 645
cases in three and a half years, which was entered into off-the-shelf database soft-
ware to generate monthly reports for the magistrate judges. 123 Presiding Magis-
trate Judge Morton Denlow said that he uses the database in settlement confer-
ences to assist litigants break impasses. In these situations, he identifies similar
115. Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And
Think We Know) about Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 44
(1983).
116. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
117. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1349 (1994) (describing the process of creating "benchmarks" in
judicially-hosted settlement conferences).
118. See Fromm, supra note 72.
119. See, e.g., Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked For, Getting What We Paid For, and Not
Liking What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943, 970-71 (2004);
Marc Galanter et al., How to Improve Civil Justice Policy, 77 JUDICATURE 185, 230 (1994).
120. See Morton Denlow & Jennifer E. Shack, Judicial Settlement Databases: Development and
Uses, JUDGES J., Winter 2004, at 19.
121. Id. at 20.
122. "To preserve the confidentiality of the parties, no party names or case numbers are included on
the form, and the date of the settlement conference is entered only by month and year." Id. at 21.
123. Id. at 22. The Center for Analysis of Alternative Dispute Resolution Systems designed and
operates the database, producing monthly reports for the court. Id. Denlow and Shack report that
"[blecause the project's format was kept simple, the time spent to develop the database was not sig-
nificant, nor is the amount of time necessary to update it each month.... one person spends approxi-
mately one hour a month entering data and preparing the monthly summary report." Id.
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cases to help them develop realistic cases valuations. 2 4 The database also can
help educate new judges who are not familiar with particular types of cases. 25
Additional courts might experiment by developing similar databases, recog-
nizing some potential problems described below.126  Courts using magistrate
judges to host settlement conferences might require these judges to provide this
data, though this system would probably work well only if a substantial proportion
of the judges participate voluntarily. Similarly, courts that maintain a roster of
mediators could require mediators to provide such data as a condition for inclu-
sion on the roster. Again, courts might choose to collect data only from mediators
who are willing to provide the information voluntarily. Some courts already re-
quire mediators to file brief reports about cases, 27 so providing basic information
about the settlements would be an extension of such requirements. Courts could
use paper forms and/or design systems on their websites to enable neutrals 28 to
enter the data through secure connections to the internet. Each court could design
a database to collect information that is particularly useful given its caseload and
interests. It would be desirable to develop some standardized data elements and
definitions to permit comparisons between courts. 129 Judge Denlow emphasizes
that for database systems to work well in practice, they should be simple and easy
to use. 13  It would also be helpful if neutrals would provide data on all cases, not
merely those that settle, to help analyze which cases settle and which do not.' 3'
Courts would need to ensure the confidentiality of the data as many litigants
would not participate seriously in court-connected settlement processes unless
they have real confidence that sensitive information will not be disclosed. 132 This
124. Telephone interview with Morton Denlow, Presiding Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, in Chicago (Mar. 6, 2006).
125. Id.
126. See infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., E.D. Mo. Loc. R. 16-6.05(B) (requiring neutrals to file compliance reports with the
courts following each ADR referral).
128. "Neutrals" include settlement conference hosts and mediators.
129. Cf Brown, supra note 11, at 337 (describing list of ten most important data elements about
ADR that courts should collect, based on survey of court administrators).
130. Interview with Morton Denlow, supra note 124.
131. For example, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Magistrate Judge
Geraldine Soat Brown kept track of all cases in which she hosted settlement conferences and found
that in cases that did not settle within six months of her settlement conference, the plaintiffs generally
had poor results. She hypothesizes that plaintiffs may have fared poorly at trial because they did not
value cases as well as defendants. See Geraldine Soat Brown, What Happens to Cases That Don't
Settle?, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Spring, 2005, at 25. For a detailed study of cases that did not settle, see
Gross & Syverud, supra note 87.
132. Some commentators have criticized the lack of access to data about settlements that affect public
health and safety or other public interests. See, e.g., David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret Settle-
ments and Practice Restrictions Aid Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv.
1217; Luban, supra note 69, at 2648-58. Thus, it might be tempting to use settlement databases to
provide public access to such settlements. Attempting to use settlement databases for this purpose,
however, would be self-defeating. Mandating disclosure of sensitive information in these processes
would certainly cause some litigants to spurn those processes and, instead, use truly private negotiation
or mediation. Efforts to require neutrals to disclose settlements would also stimulate intense opposi-
tion by the neutrals because protection of the confidentiality of settlement processes is a fundamental
ethical principle. See, e.g., A.B.A. ET AL., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS
STANDARD V (2005) ("A mediator shall maintain the confidentiality of all information obtained by the
mediator in mediation, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties or required by applicable law."),
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would involve designing the systems so that they would collect little or no infor-
mation that would identify litigants or cases. If such databases would include any
identifying information, the courts would need to assure that it would not be dis-
closed. Courts should consider giving notice to litigants in each case or requesting
their consent to include data from their case in the database.1 33 Many litigants
probably would be willing to permit such data collection if they know that it con-
tributes to a system that would benefit them and others. Perhaps the biggest bar-
rier would be a reticent legal culture wary of embracing a new process. Although
such resistance would preclude development of database systems in some courts,
experience shows that this is not necessarily an insurmountable barrier.'
34
Litigants, lawyers, courts, and society would presumably benefit from rou-
tinely collected and disseminated data about settlements. In producing such data,
courts would presumably radiate clearer, stronger, and more valid settlement sig-
nals about representative cases than provided by trial verdicts. This would facili-
tate well-informed settlements and could avoid unnecessary trials. By relying on
the courts' settlement data, litigants and their constituents 35 would have greater
confidence about the settlement value of disputed cases. This may provide par-
ticular value to "have-not" litigants, who otherwise are likely to have less infor-
available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfina105.pdf
(last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
Full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this article. For thoughtful analyses of the prob-
lems of publicizing settlement negotiations and results, see ROSCOE POUND INSTITUTE, OPEN COURTS
WITH SEALED FILE: SECRECY'S IMPACT ON AMERICAN JUSTICE (2000) (report of the 2000 Forum for
State Appellate Court Judges); Fromm, supra note 72; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 54, at 2682-87,
2694-96.
133. In the Northern District of Illinois, the court does not request litigants' consent to include the
data in the database because the data does not identify the case number, the parties, or the judges.
Interview with Morton Denlow, supra note 124. Some courts might establish database systems
through local rules or orders and effectively give notice through this generalized process. To gain
greater legitimacy for the system, other courts might provide notice to or obtain consent of the litigants
in each case. Courts might create benefits for giving consent, such as providing greater use of the
database in cases where the litigants have given consent.
134. Many lawyers and judges have initially resisted use of ADR, only to become evangelical con-
verts--or at least pragmatic users. See Lande, Getting the Faith, supra note 38, at 171-76; Julie
Macfarlane, Culture Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation, 2002
J. DisP. RESOL. 241, 254-56.
Some personal experiences illustrate changing legal culture about confidentiality in mediation. When I
began mediating in California in the mid-1980s, it was difficult for outsiders (such as novice practitio-
ners) to get permission to observe mediations. When I lived in Florida a decade later, professionals
and litigants routinely accepted attendance by observers. I observed a number of mediations and
almost no one appeared to give it much thought. One possible reason for the difference in attitudes
was that a state court rule required mediators to observe mediations to become certified. See FLA. R.
CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.010 (2005), available at http://www.flcourts.org/gen-public
/adr/certify.shtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). This imprimatur of the state supreme court provided
great legitimacy and presumably had a significant effect on the legal culture. I had a similar experi-
ence with a mediation program I directed at the University of Arkansas-Little Rock Law School in the
late 1990s where the courts directed parties to attend the mediation and law students routinely ob-
served without much apparent concern by the parties.
135. See AARON, supra note 113, at 302 (describing need for litigants to provide assurances to their
superiors that settlement concessions were necessary and appropriate); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE
MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 343-47 (3d ed. 2003)
(describing need for litigants to develop agreements acceptable to their constituents).
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mation about settlement values than opponents who are "haves."' 136 It would also
add some public accountability in a process shrouded in secrecy. Publishing set-
tlement data could also contribute to greater understanding of the settlement proc-
ess for court personnel in managing their systems and for scholars in developing
more sophisticated knowledge about the legal process. The courts are in a unique
position to undertake such a project and create such benefits. In a market for dis-
pute resolution services, courts could gain some competitive advantage by high-
lighting the quality of their settlement services, enhanced by their data on settle-
ments.
137
Maintaining a system of settlement data would create some manageable risks.
Neutrals and lawyers could use these data to exert excessive pressure to settle,'
38
which would be a serious abuse. Even without such pressure, litigants could rely
too much on the data, which cannot be completely comparable because databases
could not include all relevant factors.' 39 Moreover, although litigants can rea-
sonably use results in other cases as the sole or primary basis for their settlement
decisions, these are not the only-or necessarily the most appropriate-standards
that they might choose. Indeed, the dispute resolution field has highlighted the
value of focusing on litigants' interests as well as other possible standards of fair-
ness. 140 For neutrals and litigants to use such databases properly, they would need
to be carefully informed about potential misinterpretations and misuses of the
data. Courts might conduct educational programs when introducing such data-
bases and provide concise and understandable information sheets to assist in in-
terpretation whenever the data are used.
Another potential problem is that settlement databases could easily track in-
formation about neutrals that could distort the process. For example, if neutrals
are required to provide reports about cases where litigants do not settle, the system
136. See Brown, supra note 131, at 26-27; Fromm, supra note 72, at 700-02; see generally Galanter,
supra note 19.
137. Some people may bristle at the notion that courts operate in a market and that courts compete for
dispute resolution "business." Courts whose leaders hold these views obviously would be unlikely to
adopt market-oriented strategies to attract litigants. On the other hand, some courts do define their
roles, at least in part, as providers of services in a market. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying
text. Courts might publicize the fact that settlement services are available to litigants. Any increased
costs are likely to be minimal and might be included in general fee increases as part of the "examina-
tion of court fees to reflect economic changes" contemplated in the courts' cost-containment strategy.
See supra note 46.
138. Cf. Lavinia Hall, Eric Green: Finding Alternatives to Litigation in Business Disputes, in WHEN
TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 279, 299 (Deborah M. Kolb ed., 1994) (describing a case
where mediator pressured parties to settle on value generated through decision tree analysis). See also
supra notes 55, 113-14 and accompanying text (discussing coercion in court-connected mediation).
139. Judge Denlow said that a settlement database is appropriate for types of cases that are fairly
comparable and handled in sufficient number to provide appropriate comparisons. For example, he
finds the database useful in employment discrimination cases, civil rights cases, and personal injury
cases but not contract cases. Interview with Morton Denlow, supra note 124.
140. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WrrHOuT GIvING IN
40-55, 81-94 (2d ed. 1991). Some people may think that litigants should focus only on the issues and
interests in their case and should not care about settlement decisions by litigants in other cases. Many
litigants do care very much, however, about other cases as they "bargain in the shadow of the law."
See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 980 (1979). Given the greater number of settlements than trial
verdicts, patterns of settlements negotiated in the shadow of the law themselves become an important
part of "the law." Interview with Morton Denlow, supra note 124.
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could generate data on neutrals' settlement rates. If this would be publicly dis-
seminated, it could create pressure on neutrals to get "another notch on their belts"
by pressuring litigants to settle. 14 1 Similarly, courts could generate and distribute
data comparing the outcomes for various neutrals. It would be inappropriate,
however, for courts to publicize data identifying particular neutrals because this
would enable litigants to "shop" for neutrals who would seem to produce certain
patterns of results, such as higher or lower average settlements. Although this
may (or may not) be an appropriate basis for selecting arbitrators, it clearly is
inappropriate for selecting mediators because they should not be responsible for
producing the outcomes, unlike arbitrators. This is probably not an exhaustive list
of potential abuses of settlement databases. Court administrators who develop
such systems should be attentive to the potential for abuse and take action to pre-
vent it. There is no guarantee that developing settlement databases would produce
benefits offsetting any problems, but the potential benefits should prompt some
courts to experiment carefully with such systems.
C. Design Court Facilities to Fit Realities of Litigation
Some courthouses have been designed for an earlier era when courtrooms
were used more frequently. Having a separate courtroom for each judge provides
real convenience for judges and their staffs. Given the current patterns of litiga-
tion and financial support for the courts, it may also be a luxury that society will
not be able to afford as much as in the past. 142 Indeed, the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts recognizes this situation and, as part of its cost con-
tainment strategy, has decided to "impose tighter restraints on future space and
facilities CoStS.' ' 143 There may be ways to design facilities that better serve court
personnel, lawyers, litigants, and the public without excessive dislocation. This
might involve court facilities with more variety in courtrooms and spaces for con-
ferences in chambers, mediations, and other activities as reflected in projected
patterns of court use.
D. Reform Legal Education to Reflect the Realities of Legal Practice
Changing patterns of litigation reflect a need for legal education to train law-
yers to work as trial advocates and to perform other legal functions. 144 Declining
trial rates reflect the reality that a large and growing portion of litigators' work
involves pretrial rather than trial activity. Although some pretrial activity is direct
preparation for impending trials, much legal work involves a range of other tasks
141. See Frank E.A. Sander, The Obsession with Settlement Rates, I 1 NEGOT. J. 329, 329-31 (1995).
142. See Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative Puzzles
of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783, 835-39 (2004) (describing
Congressional skepticism about the need for courtrooms for each judge).
143. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
144. This article provides a brief discussion of implications of declining trial rates for legal education.
For a more extensive analysis of the kinds of tasks that lawyers actually perform and the implications
for law schools and continuing legal education, see Julie Macfarlane & John Manwaring, Reconciling
Professional Legal Education with the Evolving (Trial-less) Reality of Legal Practice, 2006 J. DISP.
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including client interviewing and counseling, drafting pleadings and discovery
documents, motion practice, negotiation, and advocacy in ADR processes as well
as tasks in transactional matters.1 ' In 2005, the A.B.A. revised its standards for
legal education to "require that each student receive substantial instruction in...
problem solving, and oral communication ... and other professional skills gener-
ally regarded as necessary for effective and responsible participation in the legal
profession."' 14 6 Although there have been significant changes in legal education in
recent decades to reflect the realities of legal practice,147 more is needed.148
145. The ABA's influential "MacCrate Report" identified ten "fundamental lawyering skills" includ-
ing problem solving, legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, factual investigation, communica-
tion, counseling, negotiation, litigation and ADR procedures, organization and management of legal
work, and recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A.B.A., LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:
NARROWING THE GAP 135-221 (1992) (commonly known as the "MacCrate Report") [hereinafter,
MACCRATE REPORT].
Researchers Maijorie Shultz and Sheldon Zedeck are conducting a study to identify factors predicting
the effectiveness of lawyers. The first phase of the study involved individual interviews, focus group
interviews, and a large sample survey to collect data from more than 2,000 judges, clients, students,
faculty, and lawyers in many practice fields, at various career stages, and in various career settings.
See Linley Erin Hall, What Makes for Good Lawyering?, TRANSCRIPT, Summer 2005, at 22, available
at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/alumni/transcript/summer-05/22-27-feat_23_lsat-final.pdf (last
visited Mar. 10, 2006); Marjorie M. Shultz, Expanding the Definition of Merit, TRANSCRIPT, Summer
2005, at 25, available at http://www.law.berkeley.edulalumni/transcriptlsummner_05/22-27 feat 23
Isat final.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). Shultz and Zedeck generated a list of twenty-six factors,
including elements relating to analytical, research, communication, planning, organizational, problem
solving, and conflict resolution skills as well as certain personal qualities. See Hall, supra, at 24.
146. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND INTERPRETATIONS, Standard 3.02(a)(2), (4), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/standards.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). Interpretation
302-2 states:
Each law school is encouraged to be creative in developing programs of instruction in profes-
sional skills related to the various responsibilities which lawyers are called upon to meet, using
the strengths and resources available to the school. Trial and appellate advocacy, alternative
methods of dispute resolution, counseling, interviewing, negotiating, problem solving, factual in-
vestigation, organization and management of legal work, and drafting are among the areas of in-
struction in professional skills that fulfill Standard 302 (a)(4).
Id.
147. A recent survey of law school curricula found that between 1992 and 2002, ABA-approved law
schools substantially increased the number of six pretrial skills courses, including alternative dispute
resolution, arbitration, interviewing and counseling, mediation, negotiation, and pretrial advocacy. See
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A.B.A., A SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL
CURRICULA: 1992-2002 34 (2004). ADR was the most frequently offered skills course in 2002. Of
151 schools in this comparison, almost 140 offered an ADR course, about 120 schools offered media-
tion and negotiation courses, about 100 offered pretrial advocacy, about 80 offered arbitration courses
and about 80 offered interviewing and counseling courses. Id. Law schools also increased the number
of planning and drafting, live clinical, and externship courses in the 1992-2002 period. Id. at 34-36.
Law schools increased graduation requirements for skills courses, primarily by increasing the number
of credits required for first-year legal research and writing courses, typically from two to four credits.
According to the survey, "many schools have added interviewing, counseling and negotiation compo-
nents into this course," though it does not provide specific numbers. See id. at 44.
148. In 2002, only 45 (29.6 percent) of ABA-approved law schools required specific skills courses,
simulation courses, clinical experience, and/or exterships for graduation. See id. at 20. This is not to
suggest that merely including a skills requirement would prepare law students sufficiently or that it
would be easy for law schools to change their curricula to make desirable changes. This is a challeng-
ing problem and it is beyond the scope of this article to offer a comprehensive analysis or prescription.
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Trials are essential in our legal system and lawyers generally need to know
how to perform trial advocacy skills even though trial rates are generally declin-
ing. This presents a dilemma of needing to invest additional resources to train
lawyers for a shrinking portion of lawyers' work, as paradoxical as that may
seem. 149 Legal educators, bar leaders, judges, and court administrators should
consult with each other to consider how to deal with this problem effectively. 150
As the MacCrate Report recognized, the system of professional development for
lawyers must extend beyond law school' 5' and thus training in trial advocacy will
need to continue during lawyers' life in practice. Courts have a special knowledge
of and interest in needs for training in trial advocacy and thus should take an ac-
tive role in developing and implementing strategies to address deficiencies in trial
advocacy skills. For example, courts may collaborate with bar associations to
promote pro bono programs that help needy clients and also provide useful trial
practice experience for lawyers.'
52
149. Looking only at statistics about declining federal court trial rates would not fully recognize the
need for trial advocacy skills, as many of the same skills would be valuable for advocacy in pretrial,
arbitration, administrative law, and private organizational hearings. See supra notes 24-25 and accom-
panying text (describing possible transformations of an overall system of handling disputes in which
advocacy takes place outside trial courts).
150. Interpretation 302-6 of the A.B.A. Standards for law schools states, "A law school should in-
volve members of the bench and bar in the instruction required by Standard 302(a)(5) [relating to 'the
history, goals, structure, values, rules, and responsibilities of the legal profession']." SECTION OF
LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, supra note 146. All of the district courts in the
Eighth Circuit have federal practice committees, which are charged with "work[ing] with bar associa-
tions and law schools to develop continuing legal education programs," among other things. OFFICE
OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, 2004 ANNUAL
REPORT 145 (2004).
Part of the solution could entail educating law students and lawyers about specialization in trial advo-
cacy and encouraging lawyers who are not trial specialists to engage trial specialists when needed.
Although this may help a bit, it would not address some fundamental realities of practice. In smaller
communities where the bar is not highly specialized, there simply may not be any trial specialists or a
large enough pool to try most cases. Even in larger communities, it seems impractical for litigators to
hand off relatively short trials to trial specialists, as the additional costs would often be disproportion-
ate to the benefit. For many longer trials, it is unrealistic to expect that litigators would give up control
of the case, as this would require them to sacrifice income and status. Even in large law firms, where
the income would stay within the firm, many lawyers would be reluctant to lose personal income and
status by turning cases over to firm members who specialize in trials. Thus, although creating a spe-
cialized trial bar might help address a problem of poor trial skills, it would be an inadequate solution.
151. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 145, at 305-17.
152. Nathan Koppel, Trial-less Lawyers-As More Cases Settle, Firms Seek Pro Bono Work to Hone
Associates' Courtroom Skills, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2005, at Bl. To give lawyers trial experience,
some law firms are assigning their lawyers to take pro bono cases that might go to trial. Id. These
include cases involving prisoners' complaints, domestic abuse, traffic altercations, and routine slip-
and-fall cases. Id.
On the other hand, some lawyers want to provide some pro bono assistance but do not want to accept
the responsibility of litigating and trying cases. One of my LL.M. students, Larry McLellan, has been
working with the Polk County Bar Association Volunteer Lawyers Project (centered in Des Moines,
Iowa) to develop a collaborative law project in which lawyers represent clients in negotiation but are
disqualified from representing them in litigation. Larry McLellan, Expanding the Use of Collaborative
Law: Consideration of its Use in a Legal Aid Program for Resolving Family Law Disputes (May 9,
2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Such cases that do go to trial would provide good
opportunities for lawyers who seek trial experience.
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The Family Law Education Reform Project is a good example of an effort to
revise law school instruction to address practical needs of lawyers and clients.
153
The Project was conducted by the Hofstra Law School Center for Children, Fami-
lies and the Law and the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts. The
Project engaged legal academics, practitioners, and judges to consider the skills
needed by family law practitioners and how law schools might best prepare future
lawyers to work in the world of practice that they will encounter. 154 The Project's
report provides detailed recommendations for law schools in reevaluating their
family law curricula to include such subjects as the goals of family dispute resolu-
tion, the appropriate role of family courts and judges, multiple roles and responsi-
bilities of family lawyers, roles of allied professionals, needs of unrepresented
litigants, function of dispute resolution processes, and family violence. 155  Al-
though family law matters generally are not handled in federal courts, this project
is a good model of how academics, practitioners, and courts can collaborate in
preparing lawyers to function well in practice.
E. Make Judging More Attractive to Judges
It is important to attract good judges to serve in our courts. The reduction in
opportunity to try cases may be a factor making judicial service less attractive for
some people to accept judicial appointments or to continue sitting on the bench. 156
Some judges enjoy non-trial duties as much as or more than conducting trials.' 57
In particular, some judges undoubtedly derive satisfaction from managing litiga-
tion and others relish hosting settlement conferences. Indeed, it is likely that
judges' skills at these tasks vary and are presumably correlated to their enjoyment
of the tasks. 158 Courts could take advantage of these differences by varying the
distribution of tasks assigned to different judges, so that some judges can devote
more of their time to trials, others to settlement conferences, etc. Federal courts
can take advantage of the senior status and magistrate judges to handle different
parts of the workload. Some courts, for example, rely extensively on magistrate
153. See Mary E. O'Connell & J. Herbie DiFonzo, The Family Law Education Reform, Final Report,
44 FAM. CT. REv. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://www.afccnet.org/about/fam-law-tf.asp (last
visited Mar. 10, 2006).
154. In connection with this project, Hedeen and Salem conducted a survey of practitioners and
students to determine what knowledge and skills are most important for family lawyers. See Timothy
Hedeen & Peter Salem, What Should Family Lawyers Know? Results of a Survey of Practitioners and
Students, 44 FAM. CT. REv. (forthcoming 2006).
155. See O'Connell & DiFonzo, supra note 153, at vi.
156. As noted above, such other factors as politicized confirmation processes, relatively low salary
compared with private practice, and the composition of the caseload may affect sitting and prospective
judges' feelings about judicial service. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92. In general, it is hard
to know how reduced opportunities to try cases fits into their overall assessments given the other
factors.
157. Although some judges love trying cases, other judges prefer different judicial tasks. For exam-
ple, Butler describes a judge he clerked for as "happiest in her business suit, at her desk in chambers, in
conference with trial attorneys, cajoling and imploring and yelling. She was never thrilled to find
herself draped in a robe, in a courtroom, sitting on high." See Butler, supra note 7 1, at 627.
158. Cf. Honeyman, supra note 28, at 112 (noting that, for a time, some administrative law judges of
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission preferred to mediate and others preferred to hold
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judges 159 or senior status judges' to host settlement conferences. Such a system
could free full-time Article III judges to spend more time on other tasks, such as
conducting trials, if desired.
F. Promote Local Conflict Resolution Systems
Using Galanter's concept of the "ecology" of conflict, we can see that the
court trial is an important but relatively small feature in a highly diverse environ-
ment featuring various species of conflict processing.161 Perhaps the courts previ-
ously functioned like a dominating king of the jungle. As Galanter suggests, the
conflict environment in the U.S. has changed in many complex ways, 162 making it
so there can not be a single master. In a pluralistic system of conflict resolution
with great local variation, courts play a leading role, though not the highly central-
ized commanding role that they may have played in the past.
In this leading role, courts can take the initiative to analyze problems and de-
velop court rules and programs based on those analyses. The federal courts have
been particularly active in such planning and program development initiatives. By
statute, each district court must appoint an advisory committee to study the court's
rules and internal operating procedures and to make recommendations to the
court. 163 The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990164 (CJRA) required each court to
create a representative advisory group to make recommendations about local court
management practices. 165  The CJRA required courts to consider the advisory
group recommendations but courts were not required to follow them in adopting
"civil justice expense and delay reduction plans."'166 The U.S. Judicial Confer-
ence, 16 7 the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 168 and analysts Douglas K. Somerlot
159. See, e.g., ROBERT J. NEMIC Er AL., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR 75-76
(2001); DAVID RAUMA & DONNA STIENSTRA, THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EXPENSE AND DELAY
REDUCTION PLANS: A SOURCEBOOK 227-39 (1995); Robert M. Levy, ADR in Federal Court: The
View from Brooklyn, 26 JUST. SYs. J. 343, 344, 348 (2005). See generally D. MARIE PROVINE,
SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES (1986).
160. See, e.g., Geetha Ravindra, Virginia's Judicial Settlement Conference Program, 26 JUST. SYS. J.
293, 302-04 (2005) (describing state courts' use of retired judges to conduct settlement conferences).
161. See Lande, supra note 6, at 199-211.
162. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
163. 28 U.S.C. § 2077(b) (2005). In the Eighth Circuit, each district court is also required to establish
a "federal practice committee," to (1) study the practice and procedures in the district and make rec-
ommendations regarding case processing, (2) give advice about maintaining a high level of compe-
tency of lawyers practicing in the courts, (3) work with bar associations and law schools to develop
continuing legal education programs, and (4) assist in planning the annual Eighth Circuit conference.
Office of the Circuit Executive, supra note 150, at 145.
164. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-479 (2000). The CJRA expired on Decem-
ber 1, 1997 under a sunset provision in the legislation. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5090 §
103(b)(2)(A) (1990).
165. See 28 U.S.C. § 472 (2000). The advisory groups were required to include attorneys and repre-
sentatives of major categories of litigants. Id. § 478(b). Under the CJRA, the advisory groups were
required to prepare reports including: (1) an assessment of the courts' dockets, (2) recommended
measures, rules, and programs, and (3) the basis for their recommendations. Id. § 472(b).
166. Id. § 472(a).
167. The U.S. Judicial Conference found that the "advisory group process proved to be one of the
most beneficial aspects of [the Act] by involving litigants and members of the bar in the administration
of justice" and recommended that the courts, in consultation with the advisory groups, continue to
perform regular assessments after the CJRA expired. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
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and Barry Mahoney' 69 all endorsed or favorably evaluated the local advisory
group process. The CJRA local advisory groups as well as the various bodies and
activities described above are examples of "dispute systems design" processes or
components of them. 170
Most of the clerks thought that the CJRA had a significant impact in speeding
up the handling of cases in their courts.171 Several clerks said that requiring re-
ports on pending cases had a definite impact, especially reports tracking the num-
ber of cases more than three years old.172 Many of the clerks found that collecting
and publishing statistics was particularly effective. One clerk related:
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990: FINAL REPORT 19 (1997), available at http://www.uscourts
.gov/cjra /cjrafin.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
168. The RAND Institute for Civil Justice conducted a major evaluation of the CJRA, including the
operation of the court advisory groups. The RAND researchers found that the advisory group reports
"generally reflected considerable independence from the court" and that the courts responded posi-
tively to the reports, adopting more than 75 percent of the advisory groups' major recommendations.
JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS 26 (1996). The researchers concluded
that "the CJRA advisory group process was useful, and [that] the great majority of advisory group
members thought so too." Id.
Soon after the CJRA began to be implemented, Professor Lauren Robel surveyed members of local
advisory groups. See Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 879, 897-900, 905-06 (1993). She found mixed reac-
tions, with many respondents believing that these groups improved understanding and cooperation
between bench and bar, and some believing that the process was not worthwhile. Id. Some respon-
dents were not satisfied in districts that did not have major problems to solve and where solutions
required increases in resources or limitations in federal jurisdiction that were beyond the ability of
local courts to implement. Id. The fact that Robel's study was conducted so soon after enactment of
the CJRA meant that advisory group members had little experience with those groups and may explain
why her findings were somewhat less positive than in the other assessments cited in the text.
169. Douglas K. Somerlot and Barry Mahoney studied implementation of CJRA advisory groups as
well as counterparts in the California state court system. See Douglas K. Somerlot & Barry Mahoney,
What Are the Lessons of Civil Justice Reform? Rethinking Brookings, the CJRA, RAND, and State
Initiatives, JUDGES' J., Spring 1998. They concluded that the "emergence of collaborative approaches
to solving court system problems, as demonstrated by the advisory committees established under the
CJRA...provides a very hopeful model of cooperative effort toward solving significant judicial branch
problems." Id. at 4, 62.
170. For a brief overview of dispute system design, see Lande, supra note 111, at 112-18.
171. Clerks Initial Survey, supra note 8 (clerks 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8). Only one clerk said that the CJRA
had little effect in his court-but that was because the court managed cases expeditiously even before
CJRA was enacted. Id. (clerk 9). Another clerk described the impact in his court:
The effect in [my court] has been substantial and sustained. We changed our civil assignment
system to include magistrate judges in the draw [for case assignment], we developed differenti-
ated case management tracks to make sure that cases were being evaluated for their management
needs based on the level of complexity, and we added an ADR component. In combination,
these initiatives put the court distinctly in the case management business in ways that helped in-
sure trial date certainty and accountability. Cases simply do not have the opportunity to linger
unnoticed on the docket. They are moved persistently toward disposition, by whatever method is
appropriate to each case.
Id. (clerk 1).
172. One clerk reported:
The semiannual report showing by U.S. district judge and magistrate judge all pending motions
more than six months, all bench trials that have remained undecided more than six months, and
all civil cases pending more than three years has positively impacted the court as a whole. Most
of our judges strive to keep the number of reportable items to a minimum. Instead of working
from a six-month motion report, many of our judges impose a 60-day limit on the ruling of dis-
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I've worked in 3 different districts since the inception of CJRA and my
observations are that it has made judges more conscious of and account-
able for their civil caseload and particularly the age of motions. Like
many things for all of us, once something's brought to our attention, we
deal with it. Even remembering the work that went into setting the whole
system up and the work it takes each time reports are due, my opinion is
that it's been time and effort well spent and I don't know that it would've
happened any other way.'
73
Two clerks reported that CJRA also led to the development of vigorous ADR
programs in their courts.
17 4
Although most of the clerks reported some significant effects from one or
more components of the CJRA, they reported widely differing impacts of the ad-
visory groups, ranging from almost no impact to very significant impact. One
clerk said that in his court, the
advisory group was surprisingly aggressive and assertive in its recom-
mendations to the court for reducing delay. I know this Congressional
directive was merely winked at in many jurisdictions, producing very lit-
tle of substance and almost no changes. Ours was a watershed experi-
ence. This court has been substantially reformed as a result of the work
of the CJRA advisory group, and the follow up by the judges and staff
that implemented the group's recommendations.7
Several clerks said that the advisory groups in their courts made a difference
while the CJRA was in effect but not any longer. 176 Most of the clerks said that
their courts' federal practice committees-which could function, in effect, as suc-
cessors to the CJRA advisory groups-are not very active. 177 Some clerks would
like these committees to be more active but they report little interest by the law-
yers or judges. 178 One suggested that these committees are likely to be most moti-
vated and effective when given a specific task, such as developing CJRA reports,
court rules, or electronic case filing systems.'
79
If courts are concerned that declining trial rates are causing serious problems,
there are ample precedents for them to convene local groups of stakeholders to
analyze the problems and develop recommendations. For example, courts that are
concerned about inadequacies of lawyers' trial skills could press their courts'
advisory committees to develop plans to address this problem.
positive motions. The judges' efforts are paying off. In 1993, the percentage of civil cases over
three years old was 4.3 percent. In 2003, the percentage dropped to 1 percent.
Id. (clerk 4).
173. Id. (clerk 7).
174. Id. (clerks 1, 5).
175. Id. (clerk 1).
176. Id. Clerks Discussion (clerks 2, 8, 9).
177. For example, one clerk described the practice committee in that clerk's court as being on "life
support" and said that the court's committee "acts only when we push them." Id. (clerk 9). Another
clerk said that the court "brought it back to life" to review the court's ADR program. Id. (clerk 5).
178. Id. (clerk 9).
179. Id. (clerk 1).
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Courts can also take initiative in addition to responding to problems. It may
seem paradoxical to suggest that courts expand their activities when facing in-
creasing caseload and budget pressures. However, some initiatives can create
significant value with relatively little cost. For example, many of the planning
and policymaking activities require a limited amount of volunteer effort and often
even less time from judges and court staff. Developing settlement databases is an
example of an initiative that need not require a great expenditure of courts' staff
time or money after initial development.'
80
Courts have a valuable resource to contribute to justice initiatives, namely
their legitimacy. Our society has invested great authority in the judiciary as an
essential branch of government.' 8  When judges talk, people (especially lawyers)
listen-and often take them quite seriously.
182
Courts that want to promote justice can work with entities outside the court
system in activities beyond the immediate reach of the courts' dockets. For ex-
ample, courts have worked with bar groups and others on committees and task
forces to identify problems facing the justice system and to develop solutions. 83
Courts have collaborated in conducting citizens' conferences, town hall meetings,
and community forums to promote two-way communication with the public about
various justice issues.' 84 More ambitiously, courts have participated in "futures
commissions" to "examine long-term possible scenarios for the justice system and
to make plans to meet those alternate futures."'
' 85
Like the sorcerer's apprentice, courts should be careful in using their great
power, as they venture beyond litigation. Judges naturally are most familiar with
legal rules and procedures in an adversarial system and typically view conflicts
using what Professor Leonard Riskin calls the lawyer's "standard philosophical
map." ' 86 This map is based on two key assumptions: "(1) that disputants are ad-
versaries-i.e., if one wins, the others must lose and (2) that disputes may be re-
180. See supra Part V.B.
181. See Kagan, supra note 64, at 7-19 (arguing that U.S. society relies heavily on courts as a result
of strong political culture in which the public generally expects legal protection through courts as an
alternative to centralized government regulation).
182. In a study in Arizona courts, researchers Roselle Wissler and Bob Dauber found that the fre-
quency that judges suggested ADR was the factor most strongly related to how often lawyers discussed
ADR with opposing counsel during litigation. Roselle L. Wissler & Bob Dauber, Leading Horses to
Water: The Impact of an ADR "Confer and Report" Rule, 26 JuST. Sys. J. 253, 265 (2005). They
found that rules merely requiring lawyers to meet and confer were not effective in promoting conversa-
tions about settlement and actual settlement whereas other research suggested that early court in-
volvement may be more effective. Id. at 265-70. For example, in a survey of Arizona attorneys,
Wissler found that attorneys "who reported that the court suggested ADR in fewer of their cases were
less likely to discuss ADR with their clients and with opposing counsel." Roselle L. Wissler, Barriers
to Attorneys' Discussion and Use of ADR, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 459, 488-89 (2004) (foot-
notes omitted).
183. See, e.g., Lucinda S. Brown, Court and Community Partners in Massachusetts, 81 JUDICATURE
200 (1998); Court and Community Collaboration Project, Judicial Council of California, available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/community/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2006) ("project's two-part
approach emphasizes the establishment of Community-Focused Court Planning in California's trial
courts and the design and implementation of Court Community Outreach programs at the local level").
See generally Coalition for Justice, supra note 108.
184. See Coalition for Justice, supra note 108.
185. Id.
186. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29,43-48 (1982).
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solved through application, by a third party, of some general rule of law.187 This
map clearly is helpful and appropriate in some cases. It is problematic, however,
when people assume that it is the only or necessarily best "map" for handling
conflicts. One of the great achievements of the modem dispute resolution move-
ment has been to offer a choice from a range of other "maps" to disputants and
dispute resolution professionals.' 88 The choice of conceptual maps applies not
only to disputes between litigants, but also in making decisions about case man-
agement systems generally and about ADR programs in particular.18 9 The point is
not to abolish the lawyers' standard map but rather to encourage appreciation of
the value of choosing from multiple maps to best satisfy the interests of the courts'
stakeholders. 1
90
G. Consider Changes in Judicial Policies to Increase Trial Rates ifAp-
propriate
I asked the Eighth Circuit district court clerks what actions the courts might
take to increase the number of trials and whether they would recommend such
actions. This part describes and analyzes ideas that the clerks brainstormed. Nei-
ther the clerks nor this article necessarily recommend any of these ideas, as indi-
187. Id. at 43-44.
188. See generally Lisa Blomgren Bingham, When We Hold No Truths to be Self-Evident: Truth,
Belief Trust, and the Decline in Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 131. Judges and lawyers should avoid
unconscious "creeping legalism," a dynamic in which ADR procedures that are intended to provide
alternatives to the lawyer's standard philosophical map gradually become formalized and resemble
traditional litigation. See Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, DisP.
RESOL. J., Feb.-April, 2003, at 37; Macfarlane, supra note 89, at 1493-96 (describing major impact of
lawyers' attitudes on mediation, including use of mediation as harsh adversarial tactic); Thomas 0.
Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329,392-404 (2005) (arguing that the merger of Law
and Equity is "cautionary tale" for the contemporary merger of litigation and ADR in which ADR is
"ossified"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innova-
tion Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991); Douglas Yam, The Death of
ADR: A Cautionary Tale of Isomorphism Through Institutionalization, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 929,
1012-15 (2004).
189. Court planners and administrators should consider strategies designed to promote the interests of
the courts' stakeholders that are not limited to development of legal rules and use of lawyers and
judges. A simple example is an assumption that lawyers are presumptively more appropriate to serve
as neutrals than other dispute resolution professionals. Clearly, lawyers are more qualified and desired
by parties in some cases. However, precisely because many lawyers do rely heavily on lawyers' stan-
dard philosophical maps, some lawyers may be less helpful than other professionals in helping parties
deal with underlying, non-legal issues in some cases. Another example deals with motivating litigants
to behave appropriately in mediation. Program designers using a standard philosophical map might try
to solve the problem by creating legalistic rules prohibiting bad faith and sanctioning violators. Al-
though using such rules can be appropriate, doing so reinforces the adversarial mindset and can actu-
ally be counterproductive. See generally Lande, supra note 111; Charles Pou, Jr., Scissors Cut Paper:
A "Guildhall" Helps Maryland's Mediators Sharpen Their Skills, 26 JUST. SYs. J. 307 (2005).
190. For further discussion of potential problems with institutionalization of court-connected ADR,
see Brazil, supra note 50, at 118-49; John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business
Lawyers' and Executives' Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 61-65 (1998); Lande, Getting the
Faith, supra note 38, at 222-27; Lande, supra note 55, at 896-99; Lande, More Sophisticated Theory,
supra note 38, at 330-33. Courts, as organizations that routinely process a volume of cases under
significant resource constraints, should be sensitive to potential loss of individual attention and a
tendency to apply quick generalizations. See generally Symposium, Dispute Resolution and Capitula-
tion to the Routine, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2003).
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cated below. This article includes this discussion to identify-and in some in-
stances reject-options courts might consider to increase trial rates.
Several clerks said that they thought it would be inappropriate for the courts
to take any action to increase the trial rates because this should be a function of
lawyers' and litigants' decisions, would increase costs, violate Congressional
mandates to promote ADR, or simply be ineffective.' 9' Moreover, in response to
a question asking whether there are classes of cases that generally are not being
tried but should be tried, the clerks could not identify any particular set of civil
cases that they think should be tried more.
92
Two clerks suggested that the number of trials could be increased by increas-
ing the number of judges. One wrote, "in my view, filling vacant judgeships and
increasing the number of judgeships authorized would do more than any other
single action to increase the capacity and efficiency of the justice system.' 193
Another wrote, "I see an increased role of the magistrate judge in future years as
Article III [judges] spend more and more time with criminal cases. I believe the
magistrate judge will eventually morph into the 'civil case' judge."'194 Increasing
the number of magistrate judges may be more palatable to Congress than increas-
ing the number of Article HI judges.
Another option for any courts or judges requiring litigants to use ADR would
be to stop doing so. 95 Mandating ADR use has been controversial for several
reasons, including philosophical objections to creating barriers to trial. 96 Profes-
sor Frank Sander argued that it was appropriate for courts to mandate ADR tem-
porarily as a way to introduce it to litigants.' 97  Under this justification, some
might argue that this task has been completed and that it is time to undo ADR
mandates. It is not clear, however, that trial rates would increase significantly if
courts using ADR ceased those efforts. There is no data clearly showing the pro-
portion of cases using court-ordered ADR but it is probably a relatively small
percentage. Moreover, there is apparently no empirical evidence indicating that
191. Clerks Follow-up Survey, supra note 8 (clerks 5, 8).
192. Id. (clerks 1, 6, 8, 9). One clerk thinks that civil cases should generally be tried more often
because settlements often result in unfairness and a "jury trial would result more often in 'justice'
being done." Id. (clerk 2).
193. Id. (clerk 6).
194. Id. (clerk 2).
195. When asked what courts might do if they wanted to increase the number of trials, several clerks
mentioned the possibility of reducing ADR use, though they generally did not recommend this strat-
egy. Id. Clerks Followup Survey (clerks 5, 6, 8, 9). See Mark W. Bennett, Judges' Views on Vanish-
ing Civil Trials, 88 JUDICATURE 306, 307 (2005) ("I believe [ADR] has become the civil jury trial's
number one enemy. While ADR has many splendid qualities, it is, in my view, the single greatest
cause of the addition of trial lawyers to the endangered species list."). But see Wayne D. Brazil,
Should Court-Sponsored ADR Survive?, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 241, 254-58 (2006) (arguing
that termination of court ADR programs would cause numerous problems).
196. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
197. See Frank E.A. Sander, The Future of ADR, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 3, 8 (comparing rationale for
mandatory mediation to affirmative action, as a "temporary expedient" to overcome resistance to using
ADR). Summarizing empirical research, Macfarlane reports:
mandatory processes seem to be able to produce some of the same types of change [in lawyers'
approach to practice], at least over the mid to long term. A number of studies of mandatory
processes show similar refraining and reorientation among many lawyers, although these inevita-
bly are more gradual and less widespread than among a self-selected group [of collaborative law-
yers who actively seek to change their mode of practice].
Macfarlane, supra note 89, at 1504.
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ADR has caused a reduction in trial rates. 98 Considering all the forces that
prompt litigants to settle, it seems likely that many cases-perhaps the vast major-
ity-that now go through court-connected ADR processes would settle anyway.
19
Having institutionalized ADR practice to a significant extent, some lawyers might
well initiate ADR without pressure from the courts (including mandates to use
ADR). The courts' pressure has been helpful for many lawyers, however, as it
enables them to avoid the appearance of weakness caused by suggesting ADR.
Without the legitimacy and structure of court ADR programs to initiate the proc-
ess, some lawyers would procrastinate and/or play "chicken," resulting in negotia-
tions in the sub-optimal environment of the courthouse steps on the day of trial.2°
Scheduling settlement events at appropriate times in the litigation and offering the
help of skilled neutrals seems more rational for litigants and courts. If the local
culture in particular courts promotes excessive settlement pressure on litigants by
judges or mediators, those courts should take action to avoid such pressure.
Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not increase the number of
trials in those courts.
Another option would be to reduce or eliminate case management procedures,
at least for shorter cases. 202 Although case management is intended to make the
process more rational for litigants and the courts, the cumulative effect could in-
hibit litigants from proceeding to trial.
Some courts have experimented with reducing litigation procedures to make
trials more attractive for simpler cases but few litigants have used these rules,
however. For example, in 1995, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri adopted a rule providing for "differentiated case management," includ-
198. Galanter expresses some doubt that use of ADR has generally reduced trial rates, noting that "the
decline in trials is very general, across the board, and is not confined to sectors or localities where
ADR has flourished." Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 20, at 517. To the extent, if any, that
ADR does contribute to a reduction in trial rates, it seems likely that ADR use is not a major independ-
ent cause and may itself be the result of other factors prompting litigants to go to trial less often. See
Hecht, supra note 29, at 182 (rejecting idea of restricting ADR use, as being "distinctly un-democratic"
and unlikely to be effective); Syverud, supra note 101, at 1940-43 (arguing that there are three main
causes for decline in civil jury trials-expense and delay of litigation, "commodification of civil
claims" through insurance contingency fees, and distrust of juries by business and government liti-
gants-which "operate incidentally to promote ADR").
199. It is not clear that use of mediation significantly increases the settlement rate. In summarizing
research on this issue, Wissler found that "[o]f the eight studies that included a comparison group of
nonmediation cases, half found that cases referred to mediation tended to have a somewhat higher rate
of settlement, or a somewhat lower rate of trial or judgment on a dispositive motion, than did cases not
referred to mediation ... but half found no differences." Wissler, supra note 107, at 65 (citations
omitted). See also Burbank, supra note 44, at 585 (arguing that there is no empirical evidence that
ADR causes settlements that would not otherwise occur).
200. Macfarlane describes the problem this way:
Most settlement takes place either shortly before trial or "on the courtroom steps." Of particular
concern are the delay in commencing serious negotiations until significant resources have been
expended and the restrictive, depersonalized, and often inadequate character of negotiated solu-
tions. A further concern should be the apparently minimal amount of time lawyers actually
spend on negotiation, especially when compared with their efforts to pursue litigation.
Macfarlane, supra note 89, at 1489 (footnotes omitted).
201. See supra notes 55, 113-14 and accompanying text.
202. The clerks discussed whether courts might increase the number of trials by reducing case man-
agement procedures under the theory that this might give lawyers more control and reduce costs.
Clerks Discussion, supra note 8. A guest in the discussion opposed that idea, saying that courts use
case management for good reasons and that undoing it would "turn back the clock." Id.
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ing an "expedited track., 20 3  In this track, "cases are expected to be concluded
within 12 months of filing, with minimal judicial involvement. Motion and dis-
covery deadlines are established by a standardized Case Management Order.,
2 0 4
Prior to the initial scheduling conference, litigants indicate their preference about
designation of the case management track for their cases, which judges generally
honor.20 5 Only a tiny proportion of cases have gone through the expedited
track.2°  Similarly, in 2001, the District Court in Minnesota adopted rules for
207
expedited litigation, but no one has yet used the procedure despite extensive
efforts to engage judges and lawyers in developing and publicizing the rules.20 8
There are several possible explanations for the low usage of these rules. 9
Despite lack of success to date, some courts might analyze the experience with
such rules and develop variations-perhaps with more flexibility-in consultation
with litigators and other stakeholders. Moreover, litigants could conceivably con-
tract for streamlined litigation and trials in their own cases,2t0 and courts or legis-
latures might encourage (and/or regulate) such efforts.
Another option would be for courts to deny more summary judgment mo-
tions. This idea is highly inappropriate, however, as summary judgment decisions
are ultimate dispositions of cases. Cases where there is no material fact at issue
203. E.D.Mo., LOCAL RULES OF COURT, R. 16-5.01, available at http://www.moed.uscourts.gov
/documentsfloclrule.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
204. Id.
205. Id. R. 3-5.02.
206. Telephone interview with Jim Woodward, Court Clerk, U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Missouri (Feb. 7, 2006).
207. See D. Minn., RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR EXPEDITED TRIALS, available at http://www.mnd-
.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). The rules provide that "[p]arties may agree to have existing
or future disputes resolved under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but with limited discovery and
an expedited trial." Id. The rules establish short time limits for the pretrial conference, discovery, and
the trial date and strictly limit the amount of discovery and testimony. Id. Parties must request court
permission to file motions and, if granted, the length of the parties' memoranda is limited. Id. At trial,
each side will have eight hours of trial time. Id. The judgment must be entered within thirty days after
the matter is submitted. Id.
208. Telephone interview with James M. Rosenbaum, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for the District
of Minnesota, in Minneapolis (Feb. 6, 2006).
209. For example, some lawyers may be comfortable with the existing procedures and are reluctant to
change. Some may be afraid to make a binding commitment to restrictive rules, fearing that they
might lose control of their cases. Some may worry that they would be forced, in effect, to commit
malpractice by making decisions without sufficient preparation. Such a reaction might be based on a
concern that the rules may not provide enough flexibility to deal with issues they can not anticipate at
the outset of a case. Some lawyers may not want to admit that their cases are simple and do not need
the "normal" treatment. Some may choose the traditional process to generate more legal fees.
210. See generally Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure
Negotiable, 75 GEo. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (arguing that procedural rules should be
treated as default rules and that litigants should have the right to customize their litigation); Henry S.
Noyes, If You (Re)Build it They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitra-
tion's Image (Litigation & Procedure Abstracts 2006), available at
http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=891301 (last visited June 1, 2006) (arguing that
contracts to modify rules of litigation can accomplish procedural benefits of arbitration and such con-
tracts have potential for creativity and efficiency as well as potential for abuse); Elizabeth Thomburg,
Designer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181 (describing potential for parties to negotiate pre-dispute
agreements specifying many details of litigation and trial procedure). Some advocate a "chess clock"
model in which litigants agree to a fixed and limited amount of time to present their cases at trial. See
Patricia Lee Refo, Opening Statement-The Vanishing Trial, LrT1G., Winter 2004, 2, at 3; see also
Landsman, supra note 71, at 984 (endorsing Refo's "chess clock" model of trial).
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should not be tried merely to increase the trial rate. Inappropriately denying
summary judgment motions increases costs to all litigants and creates unfairness
by forcing the moving party to undergo the cost, delay, and risk of trial. Some
such litigants would presumably settle to avoid these consequences, unfairly mak-
ing them pay damages (or, in the case of plaintiffs, receive smaller settlements)
than they should under the law. Courts do vary in the rates in which they grant
summary judgment motions, suggesting that there may be some degree of arbi-
trariness in setting the de facto standard for deciding these motions. It may be
appropriate for courts to take action to standardize their application of the standard
and perhaps raise or lower it generally in the interests of justice.212 Courts should
not lower the standard, however, merely to increase the trial rate.
Yet another option would be to set firm trial dates in civil cases. According
to a participant in the clerks' discussion, parties sometimes file cases in state court
because they cannot get a trial date in federal court that they can count on.21 3
When a trial has to be rescheduled at the last minute, litigants are frustrated at the
expense and inconvenience of having to prepare for trial more than once. Courts'
ability to assure trial dates in civil cases may depend on having a sufficient num-
ber of judges to handle the overall caseload.
The options for increasing trial rates described in this sub-part generally seem
inappropriate, unrealistic in the foreseeable future, and/or unlikely to make a sig-
nificant difference. This suggests that there are not ready policy options for courts
to change the trends in trial rates in the U.S., at least in the federal courts. To the
extent that these trends create problems, responsible individuals and institutions
should focus on addressing those problems as described above.
VI. CONCLUSION
From the observations of the Eighth Circuit clerks, it is not clear that declin-
ing trial rates have actually caused general or significant problems. Changing
litigation and trial patterns do give courts an opportunity to reflect on their roles
and missions in the administration of justice. Gross argues that some trials are
necessary but it is not clear that we now have too few of them:
To be sure, our system of litigation does require some trials. Except in
extraordinary situations, at least a few trials are necessary to set the terms
of bargaining for the 98 percent to 99.5 percent of cases that settle, and to
keep the threat of trial alive. But there's no reason to believe we've ap-
proached that irreducible minimum with 4,569 federal civil trials a
year.
2 14
211. See Burbank, supra note 44, at 613.
212. See Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E. Gardner, Judicial Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment in
the Era of Managerial Judging, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 91 (2002) (arguing that courts should have dis-
cretion whether to deny summary judgment motions).
213. Clerks Discussion, supra note 8.
214. Gross, supra note 56, at 3. This statement should refer to 98 percent to 99.5 percent of cases that
are terminated without trial as some of these cases are terminated by procedures other than settlement.
See Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Settlements Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications,
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In general, there are other mechanisms for achieving the same goals as trials,
and thus, it is appropriate to weigh carefully the benefits and problems associated
with the various mechanisms. In some cases, trials are the most appropriate
mechanisms and the courts should ensure that litigants have the opportunity to try
those cases. Contemporary courts in the U.S. operate in an environment with
constrained public financing and heightened competition for delivery of dispute
resolution services. Historically, a minority of cases were tried--especially if one
counts proceedings that resemble modem trials-and it is not realistic to expect
modern courts to provide trials in a large proportion of cases.216 Although some
courts may treat the declining use of trials as a crisis calling for defensive reac-
tions, others will take advantage of this opportunity to develop innovative ways to
improve their services. Innovation usually results in some benefits and new prob-
lems. Court planners and administrators should be alert to and deal with such
problems as they arise.
Mark Twain reportedly said that "everybody talks about the weather, but no-
body does anything about it."' 217 The "vanishing trial" may be similar. Given that
the causes for the broad trend in reduction of trials are probably complex and
deeply rooted, it seems unlikely that modest policy changes would significantly
affect the trend. For those interested in doing something about any problems that
are related to this trend, this article analyzes some options to consider. It would
be inappropriate to make universal recommendations for all courts because of the
variations between courts, limited knowledge about the causes and effects of
changes in trial patterns, and the significant impact of local legal culture. 211 It
would be appropriate for courts to assess their needs, experiment with policies that
might address them within the resources available, and evaluate the impact of
their policy experiments. 2 19 Innovative courts may be especially interested in de-
veloping settlement databases,22 ° which can not only help litigants and courts
directly address some problems caused by reduced trial rates and but also contrib-
ute to greater understanding of the legal system.
and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 705 (2004).
215. See supra Part I1.B.
216. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Day Before Trials Vanished, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 689,
691-93 (2004).
217. Columbia World of Quotations, available at http://www.bartleby.com66/9/61909.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2006).
218. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
219. See Lande, supra note 11, at 108-26.
220. See supra Part IV.B.
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